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Abstract
The events in Ukraine in 2014 had an impact on the global
economic and political relations. The annexation of Crimea
and the “hybrid” war in the East of the country stopped many
international agreements and brought about changes in the
Ukrainian economy. Against this background, we analyze the
location choices of firms in Ukraine, how they realize their
competitive advantages, and we also estimate a mechanism
of deepening integration through participation to Global Va-
lue Chains (GVCs).
The main aim of this thesis is to provide different perspec-
tives on the study of a firm’s location choice in Ukraine and
positioning of Ukrainian firms in the GVCs. Nevertheless, in
the second chapter, we also provide some descriptive anal-
yses of macroeconomic stability and international trade in
Ukraine during the conflict and provide some recommenda-
tions. In the third chapter, we estimate the location behav-
ior of firms before the conflict and find that the negative im-
pact on the location choice in the regions currently in con-
flict began long time ago. We relate their possible relations
to the privatization processes. Moreover, we investigate the
general pattern of location choice of firms in Ukraine, us-
ing a unique dataset of 251,201 firms, showing the impact of
key drivers, that have a significant impact on the location of
new and innovative economic activities. Finally, in the fourth
chapter, we estimate the position of Ukrainian firms on the
supply chain with respect to their parents, showing that sub-
sidiaries of multinational enterprises in Ukraine are closer to
final goods production.
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic openness and attractiveness for foreign direct investment (FDI)
are key drivers for a country’s economic growth. However, during the
past 4 years, Ukraine has faced an unprecedented political and economic
crisis. An armed confrontation in the East of the country and the an-
nexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federa-
tion still challenge the economic perspectives of Ukraine, with important
changes in the economic and political relations of the country with the
rest of the world.
In general, Ukraine has a significant potential to attract investments
from abroad in labor-intensive industries, considering also its big inter-
nal market. In addition, Ukraine has a favorable geo-location with easy
access to different strategic markets, including the European Union (the
EU), Russia, and the Middle East. In addition, the country is rich of nat-
ural resources and skilled employees. Nonetheless, the country’s risk of
doing business is still high due to an instability of the economic legisla-
tion and, of course, because the current conflict with Russia is still unre-
solved. Fluctuations in infrastructure, prices, and exchange rates tend to
decrease the attractiveness of the Ukrainian market. Finally, a high level
of corruption and an absence of transparency in the judicial system make
new investors feel unsafe.
It is true that the strategic goals in Ukraine have changed. First, the
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country has to preserve its territorial integrity, improve the integration
with the EU, and solve peacefully the ongoing conflict in the East. Only
in a second instance, the country can think of improving its attractiveness
to new foreign and domestic business activities. Somehow following the
same order of priorities, this thesis starts from considering Ukrainian
policies in times of war, in connection with the association agreement
with the European Union. Then we study the determinants of the loca-
tion choice by new firms. After, we study the participation and the bene-
fits of integration into global value chains (GVCs) with a focus on multi-
national enterprises. Throughout the thesis several econometric models,
network metrics and big data algorithms have been used to quantita-
tively assess the different research questions.
After the present introduction, Chapter 2 describes the Ukrainian poli-
cies in times of the on-going war with the Russian Federation in Don-
bas. The chapter analyses the macroeconomic stability in Ukraine, to-
gether with providing the statistical information on its indicators, which
show the negative impact of the last tragic events in Ukraine and very
weak signs of overcoming the political and economic crises. Further, the
study describes the stages of financial management in the country and
potential aspects that caused debt overhang in Ukraine. Considering
that macroeconomic stability is impossible without reforms, we describe
some of the important reforms during the last few years and the possible
ways of their improvement. The following part on Ukraine’s trade pol-
icy considers the general analysis of the current situation of Ukrainian
exports and imports, highlighting the change in trade partners and the
possible reasons for such activity. We separately report Ukrainian rela-
tions with EU and Russia, as currently, it has a special importance in the
further direction of Ukrainian growth, development, and positioning in
the global market. Finally, we provide some possible recommendations
for the improvement of the current situation of the national economy and
policy.
Moreover, in this chapter we show that during the last 4 years the
Ukrainian policy on production and foreign affairs has undergone revi-
sions. First, their internal economic relations have changed owing to a
2
catastrophic production decrease in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and
total loss of production in Crimea1. As a result, another problem arose,
which is related to the destabilisation of the links of “material - produc-
tion - sales” between the regions in conflict and the rest of Ukraine. Fur-
ther, the foreign affairs of Ukraine have changed significantly, particu-
larly in terms of trade policy. Currently, the direction of trade is more ori-
ented towards the EU 2, while trade turnover with Russia has decreased
owing to global sanctions. Furthermore, Ukrainian exports and imports
have witnessed the significant recession starting from 2014. For exam-
ple, one of the main problems of the export decrease was an excessive
dependence of Donbas region on external conditions in markets of major
export commodities. In addition, Appendix B provides the estimation
of extensive and intensive margins of Ukrainian trade during 2005-2014
based on the study of Hummels and Klenow (2005). The results show
that exports and imports of Ukraine mostly occur on the intensive mar-
gin.
Therefore, considering the macroeconomic and macro-financial situ-
ation in the country, it is equally important to analyse the investment
patterns in Ukraine. The investigation of the location and agglomeration
patterns of firms can provide a possible explanation to the industrial di-
vide and positioning of the country in the global value chains.
In Chapter 3, we study the changing determinants of location and ag-
glomeration of firms in Ukraine before the conflict started in 2014. In this
context, we provide the institutional framework behind the Ukrainian
privatization process. We perform empirical investigations on the en-
try of new firms in the period 1992-2015. To define the location choice
of firms in Ukraine, we train different empirical models, such as condi-
tional logit model, alternative-specific conditional logit model and probit
model with specifically divided data into foreign and offshore firms.
1Ukraine lost at least 20% (KMU, 2014) of its economic potential during the undeclared
war.
2From 1 January 2016 to June 2017, the free-trade zone was working de-facto as the
Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September, 2017.
This agreement helps Ukraine to cooperate with new markets and overcome the economic
recession.
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First, we provide some interesting descriptive statistics on the present
industrial specialisation patterns at the regional level. In this case, we
find a strong dependence on choices of industrial policies that were made
well before the transition to market as well as during the first episodes
of mass privatization. The impact is particularly relevant for Eastern
regions that are now under conflict. Hence, we observe that new and
innovative firms more likely to choose to locate in Western regions start-
ing from 2007. The language divide across the regions appears to be an
important factor in location choices between majority Russian-speaking
and majority Ukrainian-speaking areas. However, the regions that are
now in conflict had already started to be less attractive since 2000. Fur-
ther, a differential pattern of investment is found in terms of industrial
specialisation and geographic location, where we separate FDI from the
case of foreign firms whose ultimate ownership is tracked in a financial
offshore country.
In Chapter 4, we test at the firm-level, the optimal organisational pat-
tern of parents’ and affiliates’ positioning along the supply chain. Con-
sidering this purpose, we exploit an own-built dataset of 7,824 parents,
which control 15,584 affiliates located in Ukraine. For our purpose, we
source the data on the industry-level metrics of downstreamness directly
from Antra`s and Chor (2013). Assuming the industrial orientation of the
supply chain from the intermediate to final goods, we positively esti-
mate the relative upstream or downstream position of the affiliates with
respect to the parent and the successive investments with respect to the
first investment. Further, we find that in general, affiliates in Ukraine
tend to be more downstream. Moreover, once the successive decision to
invest is controlled, we presume that a vertical integration strategy pre-
vails for those parents that have a bigger number of affiliates. We use net-
work tools for preliminary statistics and train other econometric models,
such as OLS, multinomial logit model. Eventually, we use methodology
described by Rungi and del Prete (2017) and challenge the existence of
the “smile curve” in Ukraine. Thus, the results of this chapter are robust
after different specifications.
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Chapter 2
Ukrainian Policies in Times
of War
2.1 Background
Kyiv is the capital of Ukraine, which was also the centre and the capital
of Kyivan Rus, the first Slavic state and one of the largest and power-
ful states in Europe that existed in the period 882-1240. After the fall
of Kyivan Rus, the political, economic, and cultural centre was in the
Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia. However, at the end of the 15th century,
Ukraine was absorbed by different states. Only at the beginning of the
15th century, the Ukrainian uprising movement started and in the 17th
century, a Ukrainian Cossack state, Hetmanate, was created, but in the
following century, Ukraine ended up under the control of the Russian
Empire. During the revolution in 1917, Ukrainian People’s Republic was
created, which was changed by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
during the USSR times. Finally, on 24 August 1991, Ukraine became an
independent state.
Since its independence, Ukraine was under the management of oli-
garchs, well-connected businessmen, and politicians, who manipulated
both the government and population for their profit. Thus, before ev-
ery presidential election, the language question was the key driver of the
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main manipulations of the electors from the East of Ukraine, although
the Ukrainian ethnicity is 78% of the total population and Russians are
17%. The first pro-Russian manipulation started in 2004, during the
questionable elections with the leader Viktor Yanukovych, which com-
pleted with the “Orange Revolution” that supported former president
Viktor Yushchenko. In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych was elected
again, mainly with the support of oligarchs from Donbas and pro-Russian
supporters. The time of Yanukovych’s governance was criticised for
nepotism, a very high level of corruption, political repressions, and se-
lective attitude to international cooperation, in particular, flirting with
Moscow.
During 2010-2013, the dissatisfaction of the Yanukovych’s governance
was growing, and in the end, revolutionary events in the middle of Kyiv
began on the night of 21 November 2013, after refusal by the president
to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. However,
the main wave of protests started after the night of 30 November 2013,
when the police used its force against students who stayed at Maidan
Nezalezhnosti (where all the events were taking place). In totality, the
Ukrainians started their full revolution against the corrupt government
and lawlessness. The main tragic events took part on 18-20 February
2014. During those days, snipers killed more than 100 people (Heaven
Hundred) through governmental order.
Subsequent to the revolution, the temporary government took over.
In this situation of weakness, the Russian government made a pro-Rus-
sian campaign in Crimea and soon issued an order to bring the military
to the peninsula. Ukrainian military bases were blocked, ships were at-
tacked, and Ukrainian soldiers had to make a choice: join the Russian
army or leave the military or Crimea. Ukrainians were pushed to take-
up Russian citizenship as in another case, all their property would be
given to the “government”.
Subsequently, international politics, EU, and United Nations started
to call for justice and indignation as Russia broke all international rules
and agreements. The punishment that Europe and the U.S. chose for
Russia was sanctions on different levels. However, after the occupation
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of Crimea, Russia undertook the next step: a massive campaign with
bribes and provocations on the eastern part of Ukraine, which led to the
intervention of Russian army in the independent territory of Ukraine.
The response of the West was immediate, but too powerful and strict.
Western leaders hoped that financial crisis and limitation of a differ-
ent type of cooperation would hold the Russian Federation from further
operations in the Eastern regions of Ukraine. In the end, sanctions hurt
Russia, but they did not prevent Russia from waging a “hybrid” war, an
unofficial war in the East of Ukraine, that was called from 13 April 2014
to 30 April 2018 “Anti-terrorist operation” and from 30 April 2018 “Joint
forces operation”. Fig. 1-2 (RNBO, 2018), with the help of maps, show
how the situation changed during these 4 years of on-going war.
Figure 1: Map ATO on 16.08.2014 Figure 2: Map ATO on 03.06.2018
Many agreements were cancelled, many international offices on the
territory of Russia were closed, and the financial accounts and entrance
to other countries were limited to many Russians. The Russian Federa-
tion as the country-aggressor that invaded the territory of the indepen-
dent country and in the same moment suffering from sanctions changed
the global economic relations.
Nevertheless, the Russian aggression can also be related to the eco-
nomic factors and strategies. Russia spent 17 years in negotiations on
membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO), whereas Ukraine
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was accepted first (4 years before Russia). Therefore, Ukraine was one
step ahead to improve cooperation with the EU, which was a negative
factor for Russian policies. For example, the membership to the WTO
does not allow Russia to manipulate with the trade embargo or other re-
quirements, and quotas for Ukrainian exports and imports. Another im-
portant factor was the willingness of Ukraine to participate in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such an initiative led to the strong
opposition of the Russian government, which argued that the NATO’s
military proximity to their borders poses a certain danger to the coun-
try. Paradoxically, the country, which was concerned about their security
and was obligated to protect the independence, sovereignty, and existing
borders of Ukraine with respect to Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances1, started a war in Ukraine and illegally annexed a part of its
territory.
Moreover, this conflict is the last chance for Russia to maintain con-
trol over Ukraine, as the Ukrainian choice to proceed towards the agree-
ments with the EU brings new opportunities to the national economy
and provides financial support. As a result, Ukraine will become more
independent of Russian partnership and non-volatile. For example, the
latest European External Investment Plan (EIP) is associated with the
package of a significant financial support for countries of Eastern Part-
nership (including Ukraine). This plan considers the development of
the three pillars, which are related to sustainable development, techni-
cal assistance, and reforms. The successful implementation of EIP in
Ukraine will strengthen the cooperation with the EU as well as attract
investments along with the support of the small and medium business,
which will focus on job creation. Thus, Ukrainian policies in times of war
along with the implementation of economic reforms with respect to the
EU agreements are an important topic that motivates our discussion.
Finally, the situation in Ukraine is a very interesting case and hot topic
in the news, but limited evidence is provided on the economic conse-
quences of this conflict and the long-run possibility of Ukraine to de-
velop, while sustaining the “hybrid” war. Here, we sketch an overview
1See http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998 158
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based on the first comparison of trade relations between Ukraine and the
EU/Russian Federation. Moreover, we devote a specific effort to update
information on 2013-2016, as these are the years of structural changes.
2.2 Ukraine on the way to macroeconomic sta-
bility
2.2.1 Macroeconomic stability
During the independent years, the Ukrainian government developed the
economy and attempted to enhance the standards of living in the state
with respect to the developed countries. Although many changes and
reforms were implemented, Ukraine still had problems with corruption
and shadow economy, a high level of poverty, and demographic crisis.
Further, the problem with the security of the country and significant in-
crease of external debt became the new challenges during the last few
years. Thus, the growth of the national economy is impossible without
macroeconomic stability, which is associated with sustainability and bal-
ance of all the economic parameters (e.g., GDP, unemployment rate, in-
flation, and exchange rates).
Table 1 reports the indicators of macroeconomic stability in Ukraine.
We observe that the real GDP growth was almost negative since the
global economic crisis with an exception in 2011 (5.5%). In 2016, the GDP
growth became positive (2.3%) that signalled a slow overcoming from
the economic recession (among other factors, with the help of a large
amount of harvest). It is necessary to mention that the reforms in the
period 2014-2015 had a positive impact on stabilisation and increasing
investment attractiveness. In addition, the real growth of GDP increased
owing to a higher domestic demand.
Furthermore, Ukrainian exports and imports decreased significantly
during the period 2013-2016. Nonetheless, an increase in domestic de-
mand caused an increase in imports, while exports decreased mainly ow-
ing to Russia forbidding Ukrainian imports. Moreover, at the beginning
of the conflict, we report the change of the inflation rate for 1 year (from
9
Table 1: Indicators of Ukrainian macroeconomic stability
Year
Real
GDP
growth,
%
Public
Debt,
mln
USD
Public
debt,
% of
GDP
Exports,
mln
USD
Imports,
mln
USD
Inflation
rate, %
Unem-
ployment
rate,
%
Exchange
rate,
%
1999 -0.20 19,238 58.96% 11581.6 11846.1 22.68 11.90 4.13
2000 5.93 14,151 43.79% 14572.5 13956 28.20 11.48 5.44
2001 9.23 13,891 35.34% 16264.7 15775.1 11.96 10.79 5.37
2002 5.34 14,235 32.34% 17957.1 16976.8 0.76 9.63 5.33
2003 9.52 14,723 28.30% 23066.8 23020.1 5.21 9.06 5.33
2004 11.80 16,065 23.89% 32666.1 28996.8 9.04 8.59 5.32
2005 3.07 15,236 17.09% 34228.4 36136.3 13.52 7.19 5.12
2006 7.57 15,950 14.26% 38368 45038.6 9.08 6.81 5.05
2007 8.22 17,572 11.82% 49296.1 60618 12.84 6.35 5.05
2008 2.24 36,988 19.66% 66967.3 85535.3 25.20 6.36 5.27
2009 -15.14 41,535 34.12% 39695.7 45433.1 15.90 8.84 7.79
2010 0.26 55,206 40.63% 51405.2 60742.2 9.37 8.10 7.94
2011 5.47 60,192 36.88% 68364.2 82608.2 7.96 7.86 7.97
2012 0.24 65,923 37.54% 68830.4 84717.6 0.57 7.53 7.99
2013 -0.03 72,757 40.52% 63320.7 76986.8 -0.26 7.25 7.99
2014 -6.83 93,036 70.32% 53901.7 54428.7 12.10 10.49 11.89
2015 -14.30 72,134 79.33% 38127.2 37516.4 48.70 9.10 21.84
2016 2.30 75,794 81.25% 36361.7 39249.8 13.50 9.30 25.55
a creeping inflation to a galloping one), but in the beginning of 2017, it
became 13.5%. Thus, the goal of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)
was reached2. On the one hand, the decrease in inflation (from 48.7%
in 2015 to 13.5% in 2016) was possible owing to the following factors:
smooth demand growth, low level of global commodity prices, increase
in NBU’s discount rate, insignificant volatility of exchange rate with re-
spect to the positive situation in the external markets, large amount of
harvest in 2016, and finally, the success of the government to hold the
state budget deficit within the target limits. On the other hand, the nega-
tive impact on inflation rate is due to an increase in the tariffs of housing
and communal services, an increase in the price of alcohol and tobacco
goods after an increase in the license price, and an increase of the global
price of oil.
Moreover, the exchange rate caused significant problems and risks,
2The Monetary Policy Strategy defines the inflation at the level of 12% for the period
2016-2020.
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as during the last 3 years, the national currency devalued significantly
(from 8 to 25 UAH for a 1 USD) as the demand for foreign currency grew
faster than the supply. Thus, it had an essential impact on the increase of
debt and relevant payments, which were made with a foreign currency.
Considering the dynamics of public debt, it can be observed that it
has an increasing tendency. In the end of 2016, it was 81.25% of the
GDP, which is a critical level for the Ukrainian economy. The key drivers,
which caused an increase in public debt in 2014, were as follows (Londar,
2015):
• Political crisis and “hybrid” war demanded additional financing
for the state defense.
• Deep economic recession tended to the necessity of economic re-
forms and was related to the loss of governmental control in Au-
tonomous Republic of Crimea and parts of Donbas region; revo-
cation of the agreements of economic cooperation with Russia; in-
ternal and external factors, which demanded additional financial
resources and had an impact on budget implementation.
• Social and other maturities of the state that are mandatory for im-
plementation, despite the economic instability.
• The financial support of the governmental institutions and banks,
which was implemented by an increase in their authorised capital.
In general, we argue that Ukrainian economic development during
the last 4 years was driven by the conflict in the East and South of the
country. The complexity of its negative impact arises not only owing to
production and investment reduction, but also owing to the risk of ex-
pansion of the conflict and mutual sanctions between Ukraine and Rus-
sia (e.g. the moratorium for Ukraine on the direct transit of goods to
Kazakhstan through Russia, Ukraine revoked the trade preferences for
Russian import).
11
2.2.2 Macro-financial stability
Macroeconomic stability cannot be reached without financial stability. In
the end of 2010, the index of Ukrainian external debt to the GDP was 85%
(Korbushko, 2012). In 2014, it was 95.1% and in the end of June 2015, it
was 122.8% (National Bank of Ukraine, 2015), although the crucial level
of external debt to GDP was 80-100% (Iurchyshyn, 2011). Such a ratio
is associated with the lack of national resources and investments, along
with the shortage of budget deficit coverage. Furthermore, it is related to
the stabilisation of currency rate and the fulfilment of the requirements
of debt obligations that were accumulated earlier.
Furthermore, the link between external debt and economic growth
has been shown in the literature according to which borrowing could
provide the necessary financing and macroeconomic stability for the coun-
try at low levels of external debt as long as it is not constrained by po-
litical instability and weaknesses or other distorted policies. However,
the situation in Ukraine is related to the second case, where under a
certain threshold, external debt reduced economic growth. The exist-
ing literature assumes that the governmental borrowing policy of many
developing countries is mainly focused on external debt. Chenery and
Strout (1966) pointed out that foreign assistance is used to fill the gaps be-
tween savings and investments, and exports and imports. Eichengreen
and Hausmann (1999) showed three views of relations between the ex-
change rate and financial fragility. One of the three views is called the
“original sin” hypothesis. It shows how external debt is affected by the
exchange rate of the national currency. Krugman (1979) related the ex-
ternal debt crisis to the currency crisis. Thus, it is very important to have
efficient tools of administration for external debt management, such as
negotiation with creditors, foreign debt monitoring, and correlation be-
tween debt and macroeconomic performances of the state (Klein, 1992;
Krugman, 1985; Sachs and Williamson, 1986). The management of debt
contract renegotiation was described by Myers (1977). He mentioned
that it is possible and costly owing to the fact that if creditors find them-
selves in a position where the debtor is not able to pay the promised
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price, but simultaneously the agreement has a positive net value, both
sides are interested in renegotiation (i.e., it generally leads to an arrange-
ment when creditors get less than what was expected, but they get the
securities of payment).
Thus, the debt overhang inhibits the development of Ukraine and
decreases its position in the international ranking (Table A1). The accu-
mulation of government debt in Ukraine started long before the interna-
tional conflict. Essentially, we distinguish four stages of debt manage-
ment on a timeline starting in 1991, which is effectively still in progress
in recent years.
The first stage (1991-2000) involved an unsystematic creation and ac-
cumulation of debt through direct loans of the NBU. Moreover, the gov-
ernment guarantees of foreign loans were provided for Ukrainian com-
panies and the debt settlement with Russia was initiated. Since 1994, the
Ukrainian government has intensified relations with international finan-
cial institutions and consequently, the ratio of the gross external debt to
GDP increased (81.98%). In 1999, the governmental debt was already
larger than the critical value (approximately 82% of GDP).
In the second stage (2000-2007), Ukraine did not open any new loan
programme 3. Fig. 3 shows the dynamics of the net value of external
debt (approximately half of the GDP net value). Furthermore, Fig. 4
shows that public debt to GDP decreased from 43.79% to 17.09%, while
the ratio of external debt to GDP decreased from 61.03% to 45.90% from
2000 to 2005, respectively.
In the years 2008-2011, the third stage was characterised by a “stop
effect”, which was associated with the global economic crisis in 2008.
Private capital exited the Ukrainian market and as a consequence, the in-
ternal and external demand for Ukrainian goods and services decreased.
As a result, during 2008-2010, there was significant growth of external
debt. Meanwhile, in 2009, Ukraine received the second tranche from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the first loan of the World Bank
3In 2002, Ukraine was not allowed to take credits from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and from the end of 2004, the cooperation was limited to consulting and technical
services.
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Figure 3: The Net Value of External
Debt and GDP of Ukraine
Figure 4: The Ratio of External and
Public Debt to GDP
to rehabilitate the financial sector. Thus, a rapid jump of external debt
growth was observed (88.26% of GDP and production decrease by 35%).
In 2011, the level of external debt growth was increasing, mostly owing
to the exchange rate growth and issue bonds growth (0.1 billion USD in
2010 versus 1.5 billion USD in 2011). Accumulated loans during 2009-
2010 caused a threat to the financial situation in 2011, and new debts
were almost equal to the payments of previous loans.
The last and fourth stage began in 2011. In 2014, Ukraine faced a
combination of political, financial, and economic crises. The conflict in
the East of Ukraine, along with accumulated macroeconomic distances
of previous years, almost destroyed the macro-financial stability in the
country. Moreover, the economic situation in Ukraine shows that one
of the key factors that is slowing down the development of the country
is the increase of debt burden threat and excessive raise of funds due
to the rather unfavourable conditions in addition to its irrational usage.
Thus, it prevents long-term economic growth and financial insecurity.
Nonetheless, a tendency to increase public debt also lasted during the re-
cent years in Ukraine and is associated with the risks of a high exchange
rate, an unstable situation with the refinancing debts of previous years,
and debt payments pressure on public finances. Table A2 presents the
main external creditors of Ukraine.
Following the impact of conflict on the macro-financial stability, we
report the main stages of financial management during 2014-2015. The
key driver, which helps to overcome the financial crisis owing to the debt
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overhang, is debt restructuring4. The Ukrainian government used the
mechanism of renegotiation of debt restructuring. We report the key re-
sults as follows. The deadline for payments was shifted from 2015-2023
to 2019-2027, which allows making the main payment during the time up
to 2019. As a result, the Ukrainian economy will receive significant finan-
cial relief and will gain an opportunity to stabilise its economic system
and growth. Thus, Ukraine could apply the value recovery instrument,
which resolves around the issue of new securities related to GDP growth.
To conclude, we argue that macro-financial stability is very important
for a country’s competitiveness in the international market. In the Global
Competitiveness Report 2016-2017 (Schwab, 2016b), Ukraine’s rank is 85
among 138 countries, which we relate to the following key problems:
• Instability of the banking system, which tends to the worsening of
financial market development.
• Reduction of investors’ securities and as a result, decrease in direct
investments.
• Necessity of employees in the top-management.
• Migration of highly skilled employees.
• The absence of tax privileges and the ineffectiveness of special eco-
nomic zones.
• Violation of intellectual property rights.
• Ineffective anti-monopoly legislation and the lack of mechanisms
to stimulate the development of small businesses.
Hence, the new reforms should be called for stabilising the financial
system, lowering the business barriers for new investors, and deepening
the integration with other countries in international trade. In addition,
one of the main challenges is reforms in higher education and research
activity in Ukraine, which should be upgraded and be more oriented to-
wards international standards. An effective system of attracting new in-
4The negotiations on the restructuring of Ukrainian debt between the Minister of Fi-
nance and creditors started in March 2015 and were completed on 27 August 2015. The
results of this agreement are associated with a write-off of 20% (3.6 billion USD) of debt
and an extension of 4-year maturity for the Ukrainian Eurobonds.
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vestors with the renewal of education system should decrease the prob-
lem of unemployment.
2.2.3 Reforms in Ukraine
Ukraine faced a challenging situation, which is associated with the war in
the East of Ukraine and recession of the economy with limited evidence
that growth will return soon. The government has been implementing
many reforms, which are called to stabilise the situation and develop the
Ukrainian economy with respect to EU standards. In 2016, 22 reforms
were implemented, and 2017 became the year of total changes and trans-
formations. The growth of GDP and relatively macroeconomic stability
during 2016 are signalling the necessity and efficiency of the reforms in
Ukraine. We report the main reforms in Ukraine as follows5.
Governmental renovation considers lustration6, which is associated with
the prevention of doing a governmental job by individuals, who by their
decisions, actions/inactions implemented orders, which were related to
the usurping power of the former President V. Yanukovych, and also ille-
gal actions with respect to the national security and defence of Ukraine.
At the end of December 2016, 936 individuals were listed in the reg-
ister by The Law of Ukraine (2014) on lustration. We argue that the
main shortcoming of this reform is the absence of a unified independent
agency, which will implement lustration. Such an agency exists in EU
and works with high standards and strict rules. In the case of Ukraine,
every governmental agency should make all the legal regulations with
respect to their own decisions. Thus, such implementation causes many
disadvantages, such as prejudices towards a person that tends to dismiss
his/her or on the contrary, saving the position of an employee owing to
personal ties. Furthermore, EU sponsors the public administration reform,
which has a purpose to create a professional and efficient executive sys-
5The other reforms are: Decentralisation, National police reform, Educational reform, Judicial
reform, Constitutional reform, National security and defense reform, The reform of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine, Digital Ukraine, Reform of infrastructure, Project “GoGlobal”, and Cultural reform.
6Lustration is an order by the law of Ukraine, which prohibits certain individuals to
occupy certain positions in any governmental agency for a period of 10 years. See The Law
of Ukraine (2014) http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1682-18
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tem in Ukraine. This reform is needed to stabilise the political situation
in Ukraine, to reduce the administrative burden of state regulation, and
to make administrative actions transparent and anti-corrupt. Nonethe-
less, this reform is on the initial level of development, as some of the
laws (that were not voted in Verkhovna Rada), as well as the constant
normative turbulence, which is caused by the lack of common standards
along with the lack of clarity and transparency of strategic priorities, are
delaying the implementation of the reform.
The anti-corruption reform is a package of laws that is associated with
fighting against corruption in the country and was implemented at the
end of 2014. Within this reform, the following agencies were established:
National Anti-corruption Bureau (NACB), a specialised anti-corruption
prosecutor’s office, State Bureau of Investigations, and National Agency
for the Prevention of Corruption. In addition, the new system of “E-
declarations” was created. Nonetheless, the World Bank also recom-
mends establishing an independent anti-corruption court as soon as pos-
sible. In 2017, this reform faced significant criticism owing to many
disadvantages, for example, transparency of election of the candidates
to the NACB. Another main problem considers NACB’s disability to
thoroughly check all the information given through online declarations.
However, the most negative impact on the full implementation of this re-
form was caused by the fact that NACB is still under significant influence
of the government.
It is necessary to make changes in the NACB as follows. The inter-
national experience shows that the NACB should be totally independent
of the government and should systematically check every governmental
agency. In this case, Ukraine can use a mix of Singaporean, South Korean,
and Japanese systems against corruption. Thus, the NACB should have
total political and functional autonomy; it should implement continuous
check-ups on politicians, with annual reports about their activities and
full access to any accounts of the suspected person. The additional imple-
mentation of the E-system similar, to “OPEN” in South Korea, can easily
decrease the level of corruption owing to the exclusion of the interac-
tion of “officer-citizen”. Finally, special control and prohibitions against
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politicians should be implemented, which will guarantee that the gov-
ernment officer will be neutralised regarding private businesses.
The public procurement reform is one of the most successful reforms
implemented in Ukraine during the past years. It is associated with the
“ProZorro” portal for public procurement, which is completely open and
where anyone can monitor the integrity of public procurement together
with all relevant information and documents about the tender. This plat-
form not only decreases corruption, but also increases the efficiency of
procurement. The reform saves the state funds and time, avoiding paper-
work. “ProZorro” performed well and it has even international nomina-
tions, and is already considered for implementation in other countries.
Nevertheless, it still has a weakness, which is associated with govern-
mental monitoring and control of violations. The disorders made in the
electronic system by particular users are very easy to distinguish; how-
ever, the absence of the punishment for such loopholes leads to compro-
mising of all the benefits of “ProZorro” and reform in general.
Deregulation is one of the top-priority reforms in Ukraine, which im-
plements a new model of Ukrainian development and deepens the inte-
gration with EU. It is very important for Ukraine to support and develop
this reform as it is one of the necessary aspects for increasing investment
attractiveness and living standards in the country. In addition, deregu-
lation can decrease the unemployment rate in the country. The results of
this reform can be observed in the annual report of Doing Business-2018
(The World Bank, 2017), where Ukraine changed its ranking from the
80th to the 76th position among 190 countries in 1 year. The key drivers
of such changes are an increase in construction permits with respect to
the reduction of fees, protecting minority investors, and easier procedure
for paying taxes owing to the recent tax reform. Finally, the development
of this reform with respect to the laws and strategic plans of Ukraine
along with using all instruments to increase the business climate in the
country will lead to the primary plan which is to be in the top-40 of the
“Doing Business” ranking.
In 2016, the IMF provided the third tranche for financial reform in
Ukraine. This financial help allowed the country to improve the support
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of Ukrainian reforms by international agencies. The reform of the finan-
cial sector influenced the growth of GDP and lead to the decrease of the
inflation rate. One of the biggest events during the last few years was the
nationalisation of the private bank “PrivatBank”. Although a bulk of spe-
cial laws on the credits’ and banks’ activities were adopted during 2016,
the government still did not create an efficient regulatory environment
for the financial sector. Moreover, the government is expected to provide
fiscal consolidation, which will stop the uncontrollable debt growth. It is
also necessary to increase external liquidity and flexibility, which lead to
attraction of the external financial resources.
Following the financial support of international agencies, it is impor-
tant to mention some key reforms promoted by the EU, IMF, and the
World Bank. Thus, the reforms supported by the EU are approved by
the priorities of the Neighborhood Investment Facility for the period 2014-
2020. This regulation highlights the main directions for development as
follows (Mission of Ukriane to the EU, 2017):
• cooperation in the energy sector with respect to the use of renew-
able energy to boost the infrastructure network between the neigh-
bourhood countries;
• implementation of the last recommendations of the regulations on
climate change and sustainable development;
• support of investments for implementation of EU agreements (i.e.,
agreement on deep and comprehensive free trade area);
• support of the growth of small- and medium-sized entrepreneur-
ship.
Moreover, the IMF has been supporting Ukraine and providing tran-
ches of financial support from the beginning of the conflict. Nonethe-
less, the final tranche was “frozen” until the last requirements are imple-
mented in Ukraine. Thus, while the pension reform and reform of the health
system were already approved by the government, the IMF requires in-
creasing the gas tariffs for the population within the energy programme.
Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank expect the full implementation of
reform of the state property management and particularly, privatization. Cur-
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rently, almost half of the state enterprises are completely unprofitable or
not working at all. Note that these economic activities absorb significant
amounts of money and lead to losses to the budget. Thus, the privati-
zation process can fix this situation with the help of new investors and
additional money from sales of these state enterprises. Unfortunately,
the privatization process was not successful during past years (i.e., in
2014, only 2.7% of all the planned objects were privatized, while the re-
sult of 2015 was 0.9%). Nonetheless, on 9 November 2017, Verkhovna
Rada approved the new law “On the privatization of state property”,
which makes the mechanism of privatization easier (i.e. instead of five
methods of privatization, the government left only two, auction and re-
demption of privatization objects) and planned to obtain 22 billion UAH
from privatization in 2018. It is necessary to mention that privatization is
needed to increase the efficiency of the economy and to decrease corrup-
tion, particularly while political oligarchs try to control a given industry.
If Ukraine succeeds in this economic reform, it will not only gain the
next tranche from the IMF, but will also attract new FDI, which in turn
will create new jobs, bring innovations to old enterprises and will lead to
the improvement of the business-climate.
Furthermore, the reforms that are required by both the IMF and World
Bank are privatization, creation of anti-corruption courts, and land re-
form in Ukraine. While the first two are necessary and highly supported
by citizens and leading economists, land reform is one of the most impor-
tant and problematic aspects in agricultural reform. International agencies
require the cancellation of the moratorium on the sale of Ukrainian land.
Although the international practice shows positive dynamics in this re-
form, we argue that the sale of the Ukrainian land should not be allowed
for now. The reasons for such statements are as follows. Ukraine is at
war with Russia and in a deep political and economic crisis, which have
had a negative impact on the Ukrainian currency and inflation rate. In
this situation, the price of land has decreased significantly. Thus, fol-
lows the next question, “For whom it is profitable to sell/buy the land
in times of war?”. The answer is obvious, the oligarchs and large multi-
national enterprises in the agriculture sector are more than interested to
20
buy Ukrainian land for nothing. Note that land in Ukraine is almost a
quarter of all black soil reserves on the planet. Moreover, for state and
land-owners, such sales will be unprofitable. Thus, another approach
could be used to avoid a potential risks: introducing a long-term lease of
agricultural land from 14 to 50 years that is successfully used by many
other countries and attracts new FDIs. Ukraine should use its strategic
advantage in the agricultural sector and not only follow all the require-
ments, but also argue against them if they threaten national interests and
possible state integrity.
2.3 Ukraine’s trade policy
2.3.1 Current situation
In this section, we discuss the dynamics and changes in Ukrainian trade,
given that international trade is one of the key drivers of formation of
a successful and competitive country. It is important to analyse the dy-
namics of Ukrainian exports and imports. The monthly data for exports
and imports are sourced from UN Comtrade database (UNCD, 2016) for
Ukraine and from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (2017) for the
period 2010-2016. We define the beginning of the Russian aggression
against Ukraine in March 2014 as the breaking-point for pre- and post-
periods of Ukrainian trade and economic development. As the conflict
is ongoing, we report the last available monthly data and present it as an
end-interim period.
Fig. 5 illustrates the dynamics of Ukrainian exports and imports with
respect to the same period of the previous year. Thus, the recession of
trade in Ukraine started long before the war in Donbas, in May 2011.
It can be explained by the fact that the debt maturity of the country in-
creased, and exports decreased during that period. Further, the lowest
ratio of exports and imports was in May 2015 (-42% and -41%, respec-
tively). However, Ukrainian trade started a slow recovery period after
almost 1.5 years. Thus, in November 2016, Ukrainian exports and im-
ports started to show a positive trend (15% for exports and 19% for im-
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Export and Import, % (to the same period of the
previous year)
ports).
Furthermore, the dynamics of Ukrainian trade during the 7 years
show that the time of V. Yanukovych’s governance (from 25 February
2010 to 22 February 2014) was characterised by a negative trend of ex-
ports and imports. It can be related to the political views of the govern-
mental party, which did not make any concrete agreements with neither
EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), nor with the U.S. or, China. Given
such a policy of multi-vector orientation, the foreign affairs of Ukraine
lost its “searchlight”. Moreover, one of the significant strategic mistakes
was to sign the agreement to provide enriched uranium to the U.S. This
event showed that Ukraine was not able to protect its strategic priorities
at the international level. Thus, other potential partners slowly stopped
to be attracted to cooperate with Ukraine. In addition, the relations with
EU were damaged, mainly owing to the cutback of democratic achieve-
ments in Ukraine during previous years.
Furthermore, it is natural that Ukraine started to experience problems
with trade after the revolution, annexation of Crimea and beginning of
the war. Moreover, the country’s trade is more sensitive to external fac-
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tors also owing to its distribution within extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Thus, we analyse the extensive and intensive margins of Ukrainian
trade for the period 2005-2014 in Appendix B. Table B5 provides the re-
sults, which show that intensive margins prevails for both export and
imports (70%). Note that an intensive margin considers that the country
concentrates all its exports/imports on a small number of market cat-
egories, whereas an extensive margin allows to spread a country’s ex-
port/import thinly over many market categories. Thus, these results can
explain such significant decreases in trade during the war as Ukraine was
more sensitive to external factors, along with the concentration of trade
within the large economies. We argue that a new strategy should be cre-
ated for Ukrainian trade, which will be more concentrated on extensive
margins, which will allow the country to be more stable in the time of
crisis.
Further, it is necessary to understand who the main partners of Ukraine
in trade are. Fig. 6-7 show the top 10 export and import partners in 2016.
Although Russia still has the largest share in Ukrainian trade, Table A3
reports a significant decrease of export to Russia in 2016 (five times with
respect to 2013 and three times with respect to 2014). Moreover, it can be
observed, that Ukraine improved cooperation with EU, as we observe 5
EU-countries in the top 10.
Figure 6: Top-10 partners in export
in 2016, thsnd USD
Figure 7: Top-10 partners in import
in 2016, thsnd USD
Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand that if the country has pos-
itive/negative dynamics, estimating the direction of the current trend of
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the trade is essential. Thus, Fig. 8-9 show the 12 months moving average
of Ukrainian exports and imports with the Russian Federation, China,
the U.S., CIS-countries (without Russia), and EU-countries. In January
2013, we observe the switching point of Ukrainian trade, which signals
the change of the direction of partnership (exports to Russia was 21.8%
and to EU it was 29.9%). At the end of 2016, exports to EU became 37.8%
and to Russia it was 9.8%. Considering Ukrainian imports, the switch-
ing point was in February 2013, although Russian imports in 2013 was
30.2% and for EU it was 35%; while in 2016, it became 13% and 43%,
respectively.
Figure 8: 12 Months Moving Aver-
age of Ukrainian Export
Figure 9: 12 Months Moving Aver-
age of Ukrainian Import
The change is due to the association agreement EU-Ukraine Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which started to work in
Ukraine from the beginning of 2016 and allowed Ukraine to trade more
freely with other countries improving Ukrainian competitiveness in the
global market. Furthermore, Ukrainian cooperation with China has be-
come more significant during the last 2 years as the growth level of im-
ports from China is almost the same as from Russia. It can be related to
the fact that China considers Ukraine as a platform for Chinese exports
to the EU. Nonetheless, the current trend can also be related to the fact
that Ukraine established new cooperation in trade with different coun-
tries, such as from 1 August 2017, the free trade zone is working between
Canada and Ukraine. Thus, the Ukrainian government slowly started to
use the mechanism of broader exporting that is a positive factor for the
national economy.
Moreover, it is important to understand the dynamics of Ukrainian
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exports and imports in terms of groups of goods. Thus, in Fig. 10-11, we
plot the dynamics of exports and imports of different groups of goods
using monthly data, which we classify by broad economic categories and
basic classes of System of National Accounts (SNA)7.
Figure 10: Export of goods
Fig. 10 illustrates the 12 months moving average of Ukraine export-
ing goods to other countries from 2011 to 2016. The value of intermedi-
ate goods has a larger share in the total export value. More importantly,
the share of intermediate goods has occupied a large share (65%) since
2011, which is a direct consequence of the production fragmentation and
growth of the vertical supply chains. The export shares of consumption,
capital, and energy goods decreased gradually. Nonetheless, at the end
of 2016, the export value of consumption goods was approximately equal
to the value at the beginning of the conflict (approximately 11%).
Fig. 11 shows the 12 months moving average of importing goods
from other countries to Ukraine in the period 2011-2016. At the begin-
ning of 2011, intermediate goods trade accounted for 34% of the total
7The SNA consists of three groups: capital goods, consumption goods, and intermediate
goods. As we are also interested in energy, we drop the “31 Fuels and lubricants, primary”
and “322 Fuels and lubricants, processed, other” from intermediate goods. For energy,
we use separated data provided by the State Statistic Service of Ukraine for mineral fuel,
petroleum, and petroleum distillation products (including coal, crude oil, and natural gas).
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Figure 11: Import of goods
goods trade value, while that of consumption goods was 19%, capital
goods was 6%, and energy goods was 39%. The share of imported in-
termediate goods reached the highest point at the end of 2016 (41%),
while the share of energy goods decreased to 28%. In general, capital
and consumption goods occupied stable growth in the share of total im-
port goods value.
To conclude, the exporting value of Ukraine in 2016 was 46.2 billion
USD, of which approximately one fourth was the export of services and
rest was the export of goods. Interestingly, the export of information
technology (IT) services is one of the most profitable industries in the
service segment. It is necessary to mention that Ukraine is in the top-20
of the biggest IT-exporters globally. Moreover, Ukraine as an agricultural
country is a global leader in exporting sunflower oil, which is already a
final good. Furthermore, Ukraine is among the top five global exporters
of honey and its export value increased by five times over the last 6 years.
Thus, Ukraine as a country with a big agricultural potential and a very
good platform for innovations has already started using its comparative
advantages in trade, which will allow it to become a competitive partner
in the international market and develop its national economy.
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2.3.2 Relations with Russia and the EU
Considering the question, how will this change the cooperation of Ukra-
ine with respect to the conflict in the country, we provide the statistics of
Ukrainian exports and imports with the EU and Russian Federation in
trade values. Fig. 12 shows the dynamics of exports and imports dur-
ing the period 2004-2015. We divide the changes in trade into stages as
follows. The first stage was 2005-2010, when the government was led by
president V. Yushchenko, who had a programme of deepening the inte-
gration with EU. Furthermore, Ukraine became a member of the WTO
in 2008, which was one of the most important events during this stage8.
Therefore, Ukraine applied a number of WTO’s requirements, such as the
mechanism of non-discrimination, which leads to the decrease of prod-
uct costs, and reduction of the prices of the final goods and services, and
ensures licensing of some Ukrainian products. Thus, a membership in
the WTO provided the fulfilment of all necessary requirements to sign
the Free Trade Agreement with the European Free Trade Association9 in
2010, which entered into force in 2012. In totality, it was the base-ground
for the political and economic parts of Ukraine-EU Association Agree-
ment.
The second stage was during the period of the next government in
2010-2013, which was led by the pro-Russian political part of president
V. Yanukovych. Consequently, the number of agreements with EU de-
creased and international trade focused on Russian integration (58% and
67% increase in exports and imports respectively, compared to the previ-
ous year). In 2012, exports and imports decreased significantly owing to
economic and political instability. The year after the revolution showed
that exports to Europe were increasing and those to Russia were decreas-
ing, while the imports to both partners decreased, as during political and
economic uncertainty, the country should cut spending. Particularly in
2015, exports and imports with Russia in comparison to 2014 decreased
(51% in 2014 and 47% in 2015).
8Note that Russia was accepted 4 years later, in 2012.
9EFTA is a regional trade organization, which includes European countries, such as Ice-
land, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
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Figure 12: Ukrainian trade with EU and Russia in 2004-2015, thsnd USD
Further, we report the decomposition of Ukrainian export at the re-
gional level in Fig. 13. The regional divide of exports shows that due
to intensive trade with EU in the last few years, there are no regions in
Ukraine, which have more than 50% exports to CIS-countries, although
Kharkivska “oblast” was the last region that had such a share in 2015,
which became 43.7% in 2016. In addition, Sumy region had the same
level, while Chernigiv and Mykolaiiv regions had a bigger share of ex-
ports to CIS than to EU. However, the main exports remain to be to other
countries.
The general pattern of Ukrainian trade in the regional level shows
that the Western part of Ukraine has a positive tendency to export to
the EU. Hence, nine regions export more than 50% to the EU. Further,
surprisingly, Donbas (which includes Donetsk and Lugansk) also has a
share of exports to the EU of more than 50% in regional structure. This
means that foreign investors make new agreements with businesses in
this area despite the conflict. In addition, it can be associated with the
goods produced in these regions, as they are more unique with respect
to the production of goods in other regions. In the other 10 regions, the
main share of exports belongs to other countries. Nonetheless, the sec-
ond partnership is with EU-countries. Moreover, the share of Ukrainian
export to the EU is not only associated with a decrease in the share of
exports to CIS, but also to the absolute growth of exports in the country
that we mentioned previously.
Another important aspect of improving Ukraine-EU relations is the
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Figure 13: Export in regions of Ukraine for individual economic groupings
of countries
bilateral agreement on DCFTA, which implies the progressive elimina-
tion of tariffs and quotas on imports from the EU, and also the devel-
opment and implementation of various laws, norms and regulations for
creating the conditions where the Ukrainian economy will align with the
EU standards10.
Moreover, the DCFTA opens new consumer markets for Ukraine and
contributes to the adaptation of trade rules for different sectors. Ukraine
has a comparative advantage in the export of raw materials (iron, steel,
mining products, and agricultural products), chemical products, machin-
ery, transport equipment, and manufactured goods. However, the pro-
ducers in Ukraine have some challenges in exporting the agricultural
10EU legislation includes: competition, public procurement, customs and trade facilita-
tion, protection of intellectual property rights, and trade-related energy aspects, including
investment, transit, and transport.
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products as they have experienced the limitation of quotas owing to the
food safety standards and the low demand at some EU markets. This
is the reason why it is so important to adopt the technical standards
and modernisation for manufacturing and other leading industries in
Ukraine as soon as possible. The elimination of such barriers will help to
develop the comprehensive strategy and harmonised legislation, which
in turn will help to position Ukrainian enterprises as competitive ex-
porters to the EU markets.
In addition, the DCFTA considers the development of the dynamic
and competitive sector of services in Ukraine. Ukraine has huge po-
tential in tourism, financial, business, IT, research, and construction ser-
vices, which can increase the export of the country, and therefore de-
serves precedence in terms of attention. Particularly, IT and research and
development (R&D) services are one of the most promising in Ukraine,
which attracts new subsidiaries of big international firms in the sphere
of E-commerce, gaming, software development, and telecom. Thus, the
DCFTA will have an influence on the IT-sector, mainly through legis-
lation, which is associated with the protection of intellectual property
rights. Nonetheless, a higher protection of investments on innovations
reflects increasing the attractiveness of FDIs.
Note that for small business, this agreement has particular impor-
tance as the EU provides financial support (grants) from the programme
of “Small and Medium sized Enterprises Flagship Initiative”. This initiative
is provided for the Eastern Partnership countries11, including Ukraine,
which has the goal to make prominent contributions to economic growth
considering the characteristic of each country and to allow the adaptation
of national economies to the global market.
Another important policy support of the EU’s is associated with the
ban of imports from Crimea (including Sevastopol), which is in line with
the policy of not recognising the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia.
This provides Ukraine the chance to fight back against the Russian ag-
gression and motivation to improve the foreign affairs with the rest of
11The countries of the Eastern Partnership are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.
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the world, particularly with the EU.
The cooperation with Russia decreased significantly, mainly owing to
Ukrainian and global sanctions. Ukraine totally suspended any cooper-
ation in military and security sectors. In 2014, Verkhovna Rada adopted
the Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions”12, which aims to protect national
security and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and is directed against the
Russian Federation and any terroristic activity. In 2017, the Ukrainian
government enacted the decision to forbid some Russian IT-services as
a response to the “informational war” and Russian propaganda. In re-
sponse to the international and Ukrainian sanctions, Russia also imple-
mented some restrictions, particularly for trade in goods. Considering
the last available information, the Russian government prolonged a ban
on the import of certain types of agricultural products, raw materials,
and food from Ukraine to Russia from 1 January to 31 December, 2018.
However, the main driver of successful trade between Ukraine and
Russia was trading in energy. Thus, it is necessary to consider the trade
dynamics of natural gas between Russia and Ukraine, and also EU. The
export pricing for natural gas from Russia to Ukraine was not linear dur-
ing the independence timeline. From 1992 to 2005, the price was 50 USD,
while from 2006, the price started to increase and it became 179 USD in
200813 (Fig. 14).
Fig. 15 shows the gas price for EU, that is significantly lower. This
difference in prices was not economically fair for Ukraine, particularly
taking into consideration the financial capability of Ukraine and EU-
countries and their economic development14. Indeed, 2015 a “breaking
point” between the Ukrainian-Russian partnership in gas infrastructure.
12See http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1644-18.
13Such an increase in price was caused owing to the signing of a gas transit agreement
between “Gasprom” and “Naftogaz Ukraine” for the period 2009-2019 that changed the
system of pricing. It was determined by a formula with a reference to the cost of oil and its
products in the global market. According to the high level of oil prices, this agreement was
disadvantageous for the Ukrainian economy. Simultaneously, Russia started to use the gas
aspect as one of the key factors to achieve the political goals on the territory of post-USSR
countries, including Ukraine.
14In order to become an energy-independent country, the Ukrainian government has de-
signed programmes for gas supply replacement. Currently, it is associated with the open-
ing of reverse deliveries from EU-countries and development of domestic production.
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Previously, Russia was a monopolistic distributor of gas to Ukraine and
the value of gas imports was 40 billion cubic meters, whereas in 2015,
the exports of Russian gas to Ukraine decreased to 6.1 billion cubic me-
ters (in 2014 it was 14.5 billion cubic meters) and the value of gas from
the European market increased almost twice (from 4.9 to 9.2 billion cu-
bic meters). As a result, the Ukrainian government completely refused
to buy Russian gas in November 2015. Currently, Ukraine receives gas
resources from more than 10 foreign distributors.
Figure 14: Ukrainian import of gas Figure 15: EU import of gas
Source: made by author based on Ekonomichna Pravda (2015)
Thus, Ukraine has not been buying Russian natural gas for the past
2 years. In 2016, Ukraine imported all gas from EU-countries. Fur-
thermore, using the alternative energy together with energy saving pro-
grammes has an impact on the efficient development of alternative sour-
ces of energy, both for the production of heat and electricity. Conse-
quently, the development of “green” economy can make the Ukrainian
energy sector more cost-effective. In addition, it will have a significantly
positive influence on the ecology and level of public health. Moreover,
Ukraine is a potentially attractive country for “green” investments, which
will create new jobs, innovations, and will make the country not only
non-volatile, but also more competitive in the international energy mar-
ket.
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2.4 Concluding remarks and recommendations
This chapter describes the Ukrainian policy in times of war with the Rus-
sian Federation. We define the main problems, which had a negative
impact and increased the external and public debts in the country. Fur-
thermore, this chapter exploits the mechanism of financial management
and provides the key results of debt renegotiation.
The recommendations for financial management consider:
• the necessity of domestic stock market growth, which allows to de-
velop the internal market of loan capital and to protect national
economy from the negative impact of national currency devalua-
tion, international capital moving, and financial crisis;
• the development of rational strategy on the minimisation of exter-
nal debt, which is associated with the reduction of external matu-
rity and currency outflow from the country;
• stabilisation and accumulation of funds from privatization, which
should be used as an effective tool for the debt obligations pay-
ment;
• the support of acceptable level of budget deficit, which can be un-
dertaken by increasing internal financing.
Further, we argue that Ukraine had a negative impact on interna-
tional trade in 2014 not only owing to the conflict, but also owing to
the fact that Ukrainian exports and imports were more concentrated on
intensive margins. Thus, such a distribution is highly dependent on few
market-categories, which, in case of any conflict with one of the partner-
country, could cause relatively big loses. Furthermore, this study con-
firms that Ukraine totally changed its approach to partnership in inter-
national trade. In 2015-2016, there was no region in Ukraine that had
more than 50% of trade with CIS-countries. Although Russia is still one
of the main partners in trade (in terms of net value), while considering
the real growth dynamic of Ukrainian exports and imports, we report
that the EU has approximately 20% difference in trade growth in com-
parison to Russia.
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The recommendations for international trade of Ukraine are as fol-
lows. First, it is necessary to improve the Ukrainian foreign economic
policy in regards to the support of national producers through the in-
crease of their export potential. Further, the new mechanism should
involve an implementation of optimisation of the commodity and geo-
graphical structure of exports-imports, as well as the decrease of import
substitution effect. To reduce the negative impact of intensive margin on
trade, it is necessary to increase the share of the final goods in exports and
to reduce the share of energy and consumer goods in imports. Second,
the modernisation of production, implementation of innovations and de-
velopment of R&D, increase of sustainable development, improvement
of mechanisation and automation of production, and preparing high-
skilled employees in the top management should tend to increase the
output of domestic products and services. Third, the management of
foreign economic activity should involve new strategic approaches, us-
ing marketing research and analysis with effective information support
(for example, using the experience of developed countries and their suc-
cessful models). Finally, it is necessary to increase the level of competi-
tiveness of national goods in the global market.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Gross External Debt Position by Sector (millions USD)
General
Government
Central
Bank
Deposit-Taking
Corporations,
except the
Central Bank
Other
Sectors
Direct
Investment:
Intercompany
Lending
Sum
United States 6,279,766 601,821 2,726,336 6,388,768 1,567,691 17,564,382
United Kingdom 784,967 38,851 4,465,103 2,330,934 623,161 8,243,016
Euro area 2,871,185 411,341 4,139,660 3,261,809 2,923,464 13,607,459
Japan 1,017,225 55,237 1,201,467 661,082 14,764 2,949,775
Australia 210,206 4,894 658,946 334,193 192,387 1,400,626
Brazil 184,553 4,001 147,361 123,366 205,711 664,992
Argentina 69,726 14,118 4,333 38,499 31,115 157,791
Russian Federation 30,551 11,033 126,202 209,902 138,159 515,847
Turkey 84,448 1,327 164,021 141,947 6,296 398,039
Poland 136,404 5,469 54,626 52,720 79,227 328,446
Hungary 50,168 1,963 18,500 18,308 71,380 160,319
Czech Republic 28,412 2,901 34,126 29,412 31,301 126,152
Ukraine 35,959 6,708 12,823 54,677 8,562 118,729
Source: combined by author based on The World Bank (2016).
The biggest creditor is Franklin Templeton (FT), an investment fund
that started to buy Ukrainian bonds in 2013. The first purchase was for-
eign government bonds, which was worth 5 billion USD. This invest-
ment fund is one of the biggest investment companies in the U.S. and
globally, and is also part of the U.S. holding, Franklin Templeton Invest-
ments. This fund is famous for its risk activity: FT buys debts of countries
(that have financial problems) and then, it looks for funds, which will be
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Table A2: External Creditors of Ukraine
Creditor Amount of debt holder
Franklin Templeton 6,5 billion USD
Russian Federation 3 billion USD
PIMCO 289 million USD
Black Rock 258 million USD
Stone Harbor Investment Partners 237 million USD
Fidelity 228 million USD
Ashmore Investment Management 154 million USD
given to these countries. Thus, ultimately, these funds will end up with
FT itself. In totality, Ukraine was very attractive for FT, as it is a coun-
try with long-term potential, extremely high level of human capital and
agricultural funds, and more importantly, with strategic geo-location be-
tween Europe and the East.
Table A3: Top-10 partners of Ukrainian trade
2013 2014 2015 2016
Export
Russian Federation 14000.00 Russian Federation 9190.00 Russian Federation 3630.00 Russian Federation 3090.00
Turkey 3130.00 Switzerland 3460.00 Turkey 2870.00 Egypt 1940.00
Egypt 2430.00 Turkey 2700.00 Italy 1850.00 Poland 1920.00
China 2380.00 Poland 2340.00 Egypt 1680.00 Turkey 1790.00
Poland 2280.00 Egypt 2220.00 Germany 1470.00 Italy 1740.00
Kazakhstan 2030.00 China 2180.00 India 1410.00 China 1610.00
Italy 1980.00 Italy 1740.00 Poland 1320.00 India 1410.00
Belarus 1850.00 Germany 1560.00 Spain 1020.00 Germany 1240.00
India 1650.00 Belarus 1490.00 Hungary 823.00 Hungary 927.00
Switzerland 1640.00 India 1430.00 Belarus 800.00 Spain 844.00
Import
Russian Federation 15400.00 Russian Federation 11000.00 Russian Federation 5680.00 Russian Federation 4430.00
China 5420.00 Germany 4330.00 Germany 3100.00 China 3960.00
Germany 4490.00 China 3870.00 Poland 2930.00 Germany 3400.00
Poland 2750.00 Belarus 2930.00 Belarus 2420.00 Belarus 1480.00
Belarus 1960.00 Poland 2000.00 Hungary 1220.00 France 1320.00
USA 1820.00 Hungary 1340.00 Turkey 1010.00 Poland 1290.00
Turkey 1170.00 Switzerland 1250.00 Kazakhstan 944.00 Turkey 901.00
France 1160.00 USA 1200.00 Italy 923.00 USA 853.00
United Kingdom 1010.00 United Kingdom 1030.00 USA 801.00 Switzerland 840.00
Switzerland 941.00 France 1030.00 Lithuania 681.00 Hungary 648.00
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Appendix B
The extensive and intensive margins
We estimate the extensive and intensive margins of Ukrainian trade with
the rest of the world. The intensive margin has been modeled for the
first time by Armington (1969). Flam and Helpman (1987) and Gross-
man and Helpman (1991) show that if a country is richer, it will produce
and export higher-quality goods. Hummels and Klenow (2005) focus on
the cross-country differences and find that extensive margin accounts for
60% exports from larger economies. Timothy and Ruhl (2013) and Bergin
and Glick (2015) argue that in the earlier stages of trade liberalization, an
increased variety of traded goods played a more important role in ex-
plaining trade growth. A positive impact of the extensive margin on eco-
nomic growth has been found by Evenett and Venables (2002). On the
contrary, a large body of work has found that the intensive margin has
a bigger impact. Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008) showed that ex-
ports in the intensive margin account the most for overall trade growth,
while in the extensive margin, geographic diversification is more impor-
tant than product diversification, particularly for developing countries.
Besedes and Prusa (2011) argue that developing countries would experi-
ence significantly higher export growth if they were able to improve their
performance in terms of intensive margin. Amiti and Freund (2010) re-
ported that intensive margin played a more important role in the growth
of China’s exports during 1992-2005.
For our purpose, we source data from the UN Commodity Trade
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Statistics Database, which collects data on Ukrainian trade with approx-
imately 160 countries by all categories of HS commodities in the period
2010-2014. The observations in our dataset correspond to each country,
which undertaking the exports/imports activity with Ukraine. The data
on national employment and GDP PPP in 2010-2014 is sourced from the
World Bank Database and State Statistic Service of Ukraine. Except for
our dataset, we also use other variables that are presented in Table B4.
Table B4: Variables Definition
Variable Definition
Overall Export the ratio of nominal export of country j and nominal Ukrainian exports
Intensive Margin a country’s share of world exports in those market-categories in whichit exports
Extensive Margin fraction of the world exports that occur in those market categoriesin which country j exports
Y/L the ratio of GDP ppp to employment
Y log of GDP ppp
L log of employment
Further, we base the analysis on the model that was presented by
Hummels and Klenow (2005). They decompose each country’s exports
into the product of extensive (countries ship a larger set of goods to more
markets) and intensive (countries ship larger values of a common set of
goods) margins. Hence, regression samples are cross-sections (Ukrainian
export or import with other countries) in a given year and we compute
the overall export as follows:
Overall Export =
xj
xW
(2.1)
where xj= nominal exports of country j, and xW = nominal global
exports (from all countries to all countries).
The intensive export margin measures a country’s share of global ex-
ports in those market-categories in which it exports. The extensive mar-
gin for a country measures the fraction of exports that occur in those
global market-categories in which country j exports15. We compute these
15This extensive margin is a cross-country and export analogue of Feenstra’s (1994) mea-
38
variables as follows:
Intesive Margin =
xj∑
i 6=j
∑
S∈Xjis xWis
(2.2)
Extensive Margin =
∑
i 6=j
∑
S∈Xjis xWis
xW
(2.3)
where xWis is the global exports to country i in product category s,
andXjis is the set of market-category (i, s) pairs for which xjis > 0, where
xjis is nominal exports of country j to country i in product category s.
As we are estimating exports and imports only for Ukraine, the esti-
mation of extensive and intensive margins for imports is analogous.
Estimation of extensive and intensive margins
Table B5 includes the results from OLS regressions on GDP per worker
and number employed jointly, and also regressions on total GDP. For
the observations, we consider each country that was undertaking in-
ternational trade during 2010-2014 with Ukraine in 100 categories. All
of the coefficients in the tables are significantly different from zero (p-
value<0.01).
In the first part of the table, we obtain the margins for Ukrainian ex-
ports, where the second and third rows report that, with respect to GDP,
approximately two-thirds of the Ukrainian exports occur on the intensive
margin and one-third on the extensive margin. As it can be observed,
Ukraine exports larger values of goods as the intensive margin is more
than 70%. Thus, it means that Ukraine concentrates all its exports on
a small number of market-categories. In other words, Ukraine exports
more than 70% on intensive margin to larger economies.
Nonetheless, during 2010-2012 (the pre-period of conflict), the exten-
sive margin has been decreasing as the international agreements did not
sure of import variety growth across time for a given country.
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consider the increase of goods values, but the increase of markets. Dur-
ing 2013-2014, the extensive margin started to increase and the percent-
age level reached the same level of 2010. Hence, we find that the eco-
nomic interest is associated with trade development. In this case, the
country is more dependent on the values of exports owing to the fact
that if extensive margin would be higher than the intensive margin, then
Ukraine would not be dependent and would not have a significant de-
crease in the trade during conflict with one of the countries. Essentially,
the extensive margin allows the country to spread its exports thinly over
many market-categories. The second part of the table decomposes ex-
ports for a sample of countries exporting to Ukraine during 2010-2014
(import of Ukraine). The first row corresponds to the results that larger
economies will export substantially more to Ukraine. The next rows
show that the intensive margin accounts to 64%, 67%, and 69% in 2010,
2011, and 2012 respectively, of the additional exports to Ukraine by larger
economies and in 2013 and 2014, the figure was 64%. In addition, the
table shows that the intensive margin plays a more prominent role for
economies with more workers (73%, 77%, 74%, 80%, and 78%) than for
richer economies (55%, 58%, 60%, 64%, and 64%).
Table B6 provides the results on extensive and intensive margins of
Ukrainian trade during the 2005-2009. Note that in this period approxi-
mately one-fifth of the Ukrainian exports occur on the extensive margin,
and the rest of it belongs to intensive margin. Nonetheless, the extensive
margin of Ukrainian export slightly increased in 2009. Thus, Ukraine ex-
ported more than 80% on intensive margin to larger economies during
2005-2009 that was almost 10% more than in following 5 years.
Furthermore, if we compare the margins of Ukrainian imports, we
observe that during the 2005-2009 extensive margin had higher percent-
age. It can be related to the fact that during this period the Ukrainian
trade policy was oriented on attraction new markets instead of just in-
creasing the volumes of trade. Nonetheless, results still show the pattern
which shows a more prominent role of intensive margin for economies
with more workers (69%, 66%, 69%, 68%, 70%) than for richer economies
(46%, 50%, 53%, 63%, 54%).
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Chapter 3
Location and
Agglomeration of Firms in
Ukraine before the Conflict
3.1 Introduction
Ukraine has a large territory, significant industrial and scientific poten-
tial, rich natural resources. In addition, the geography of Ukraine makes
the country one of the main connecting subregions between the West
and the East, the North and the South. Access to the Black Sea gives an
opportunity to have trade routes towards other continents. The unique
location of Ukraine in between the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Islamic
geopolitical array brings costs and benefits for business activities.
The choice of initial location of a firm may have a significant impact
on its future perspectives. The question of “where do firms locate in
Ukraine?” is very interesting, especially considering that the country is
involved in an international conflict started on 18 March 2014.
We use the data in the period before the conflict started to estimate
the location pattern of firms in Ukraine. In particular, this chapter studies
the location choice of firms in Ukraine with respect to the regions now in
conflict and the possible factors that could influence the attractiveness of
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different regions during the period 1992-2014.
We use a unique firm-level dataset which provides the information
on incorporation date, investors’ country of origin and their economic ac-
tivity. Specifically, we use data on location choice of 251,201 firms active
in Ukraine between 1992 and 2014, and over a set of 27 administrative
regions in Ukraine. Thus, this is the first study on Ukraine, which an-
alyzes a large-scale dataset to estimate the location choices, while other
works (Zvirgzde et al., 2013) have studied the location of multinational
companies (MNEs) based on enterprise surveys and small samples; or
the foreign direct investments (FDI) of one particular country to Ukraine
(Nowak et al., 2015).
Eventually, our analysis generates a rich set of interesting findings.
First, the chapter characterizes economic activities in regions, analyzing
and visualizing an actual industrial, language and foreign investment
divide. Second, we argue that firms located in regions now in conflict
specialize in the production of an oligopolistic nature. Then, the study
provides the evidence of the presence of companies in Ukraine that are
registered in offshore zones. Thus, we observe that foreign firms more
likely will choose the regions close to the EU-border, while offshore firms
will locate more in the East of Ukraine.
Most important, we find that regions now in conflict lost appeal al-
ready before the conflict started. We argue that the pattern established by
economic reforms and in particular by privatization is a possible driver.
In the recent literature, studies show that privatizing the firm makes
the big country a relatively more attractive location for the investment
(Amerighi and de Feo, 2007). Nonetheless, our research goes in partial
contradiction to this statement with respect to the regions now in conflict,
although we observe that most of the regions with a higher level of pri-
vatization were more attractive to firms during the period of a transition
economy.
Furthermore, our analyses provide some important features of re-
gions that drive the attraction for doing business in Ukraine. First, it
is the level of agglomeration economies in each region. We argue that one
of the main drivers which makes an impact on the location choice of
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firms in Ukraine is the regional economy. A stream of the literature has
singled out two types of external economies (among others, Feldman
and Audretsch (1999)): so-called specialization externalities, which cre-
ate intra-industry spillovers (firms within the same sector of industry)
associated with Marshall (1920); and diversity externalities, which favor
the creation of inter-industry spillovers (firms across the different indus-
trial sectors) originally suggested by Jacobs (1970). Also, Paci and Usai
(1999) investigated the process of spatial agglomeration of innovation
and production activities in the context of specialization and diversity
externalities.
Then, many studies show that agglomeration has an impact on lo-
cation choices made by multinational enterprises (Belderbos and Car-
ree (2002); Hilber and Voicu (2010); Halvorsen (2012)), while our re-
search can contribute to the issue whether domestic firms-entrants are
affected by agglomeration. The existing literature presents fewer results
on domestic investments within the country (Shaver (1998); Zaheer et al.
(2009); Mayer et al. (2010)) comparing to the literature on FDI location
choice.
Our study can contribute to the literature on the impact of agglomer-
ation externalities. The contributions on Ukraine specific case were few
(Bru¨mmer et al., 2010; Vakhitov and Bollinger, 2010), whereas there are
many studies that give us results on location choice in different coun-
tries (United States (Coughlin et al., 1991), Portugal (Guimaraes et al.,
2000), Hungary (Boudier-Bensebaa, 2005), Japanese firms in U.S. (Head
et al., 1995)). Among the empirical studies on location choice, Nowak
et al. (2015) analyzes Ukraine’s location advantages and disadvantages
for Polish FDI in Ukraine, while Zvirgzde et al. (2013) use empirical data
of firms’ surveys of 153 foreign firms in three regions of Ukraine to ana-
lyze the location choice of FDI.
Moreover, we determine the impact of the language spoken in regions
as the driver for firm’s location, that was largely ignored in the literature.
We expect the similar effect of language as family ties or co-ethnic-bonds
have (e.g., if the firm is owned by ethnic polish, she will establish a firm
in the region closer to the border with Poland). For example, Jean et al.
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(2011) showed the impact of ethnic ties on FDI location choice. Chand
and Ghorbani (2011) investigated the higher possibility to locate the firm
in regions with the larger ethnic community to which belong the owner.
Nonetheless, we find that foreign-owned firms locate in regions that pos-
sess higher openness to trade, innovation potential, and demand.
Our particular interest is how the geolocation of Ukrainian regions
with respect to national borders affects the investor’s decision on loca-
tion the economic activity. Allocation of the firm close to the borders
considers geoeconomic and geostrategic aspects that play a significant
role in the strategic partnership for a high degree of mutual interest. The
importance of border effects for foreign firms was investigated by Cies´lik
(2005), who showed the importance of being next to the EU-border. Ex-
cept for border with other countries, another important region in each
country is the capital.
The remainder of our chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
provides the institutional framework on privatization. In section 3.3 we
describe the data that shows the preliminary analysis of the Ukrainian
situation. In section 3.4 we introduce methods and results. Section 3.5
concludes this chapter.
3.2 The institutional framework
After Ukraine became independent, a transition to a market economy
started. A privatization mechanism was designed to open state-owned
firms to private property. The objective was to improve the allocation of
resources in the productive sector. Among other Eastern-European coun-
tries, the Ukrainian privatization process picked up momentum later and
under the conditionality of IMF funding. In fact, we can distinguish three
stages (Pashaver and Verhovodova, 2003) on a timeline starting in 1992
and effectively still in progress in recent years.
A first stage involved the privatization of 1,240 medium and large-
scale enterprises. In the years 1992-1994, managers and associations of
employees signed lease buyout contracts with the government. Nonethe-
less, a moratorium postponed the impact of this first stage until a new
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national currency, which was actually introduced only in 1996. A partial
failure of this stage negatively affected the support of following efforts,
when some, so-called strategic industries, were systematically excluded
from privatization (e.g., shipbuilding, fuel and energy, mining). The fo-
cus was on rapid distribution to the public and development of capital
markets.
In the second stage (1995-1998), mass privatization involved the is-
sue of privatization certificates, also called “vouchers”, which attracted
the public to purchase the stakes, both in large and medium-sized enter-
prises and so-called “small objects” 1. In this case, the main purpose was
to obtain a faster and transparent competitive system, although revenue
generation was a lower priority. However, as the public was not accus-
tomed to property rights, a lack of knowledge in how properly using the
vouchers system triggered an increase in speculative behavior. When
salaries and pensions were not paid, and an increase in poverty level
started to bite, about 30 million people (Padalka, 2012) lost the owner-
ship of their certificates, selling them to special trust funds, to monetize
these rights. As a result, financial intermediaries concentrated a signifi-
cant part of the privatized assets. In reality, more than often, a barter of
vouchers started, such that previously appointed directors of firms ac-
quired control of companies becoming the major shareholders of their
own companies (i.e., oligarchs). At the same time, privatized companies
were often monopolists in their industry of activity.
From 1999, the third stage of privatization started to identify strate-
gic investors case-by-case (Zorome, 2007). The focus this time was on
cash privatization, to maximize revenues via stock exchange sales. More
effort was put on establishing a long-term competitive environment. Fi-
nally, the last purpose of the third stage privatization program was to
promote and attract more funds to the state budget. However, strategic
enterprises were actually privatized in period 2000-2002, following the
requirements indicated in Pashaver and Verhovodova (2003)2.
1In the jargon of the reform, small objects include not only small companies but also
property rights in other non-productive activities, including objects of social and cultural
destination. For example, property rights in real estate. (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1992)
2The investor had to be interested in the preservation of the market shares at least for
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The process of privatization is still going on. In Table 2, we report the
number of firms, which were objects of privatization, by regions in the
period 1992-2015. We observe that regions now in conflict have seen the
privatization of about 20% of the total, although the main region where
we can find a higher number of firms is Lviv in the West of the country.
If we look at the industry level, the sectors mostly involved in priva-
tization process were (Pashaver and Verhovodova, 2003): wholesale and
retail trade (including the sale of vehicles and their repair) - 39,9% of total
firms, other services - 16.9%, manufacturing - 9.8%.
Interestingly, another 17% of the total number of firms is located in
regions next to the conflict (Dnipropetrovska, Harkivska, and Zapor-
izka). At the beginning of 2016, 131,503 objects were privatized, includ-
ing 29,326 (22.3%) and 102,177 (77.7%) objects that belong to communal
and state property, respectively.
The overall impact of the privatization process on economic devel-
opment has been long debated since the transition to market economy
started in several countries after the fall of the iron curtain in Europe.
Previous works identified models of privatization as dependent on how
property rights are distributed (Schmidt, 2000), i.e., mass privatization
destined to the general public or case-by-case privatization after identi-
fication of strategic investors. Another useful categorization of reform
design is whether it involves insiders (managers, workers or both) or
outsiders (the general population). If we follow the Ukrainian timeline,
we can find a combination of the general a case-by-case privatization,
although the open to outsiders mass privatization prevails, as it was
perceived as fair. Unfortunately, the process led to unexpected conse-
quences, since the system of “vouchers” required also an institutional
environment where shareholders are aware of the value of the property
rights embedded in an equity stake. Instead, a cheap barter of stakes by
the public with shorter run advantages generated an undervaluation of
the privatized companies, which accelerated bankruptcy or resulted in
the concentration of corporate power in the hands of former directors.
the following 3 years; the investor was required to produce the same goods (services) and
keep the same suppliers as before privatization for no less than one year.
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Table 2: Number of privatized firms during 1992-2015
Region State property Communal property Total number of firms % from total
Donetska 4177 9150 13327 10.1
ARC 393 6534 6927 5.3
Luganska 1680 4199 5879 4.5
Sevastopol 215 635 850 0.6
Lvivska 16533 11368 27901 21.2
Kyiv 1152 11996 13148 10.0
Dnipropetrovska 1857 6391 8248 6.3
Harkivska 1635 6431 8066 6.1
Zaporizka 1342 4533 5875 4.5
Odeska 1473 3543 5016 3.8
Ivano-Frankivska 490 3999 4489 3.4
Mykolaiivska 1124 2931 4055 3.1
Poltavska 929 2503 3432 2.6
Sumska 868 2385 3253 2.5
Ternopilska 776 2451 3227 2.5
Chernivetska 501 2653 3154 2.4
Kyivska 1089 2065 3154 2.4
Zakarpatska 430 2643 3073 2.3
Zhytomyrska 1258 1781 3039 2.3
Vinnytska 1312 1657 2969 2.3
Kirovogradska 698 2092 2790 2.1
Cherkaska 827 1798 2625 2.0
Volynska 705 1919 2624 2.0
Khmelnytska 607 2000 2607 2.0
Hersonska 584 1939 2523 1.9
Rivnenska 880 1504 2384 1.8
Chernihivska 671 1077 1748 1.3
Total 29326 102177 131503 100
Source: combined by author based on State Property Fund of Ukraine (2015)
In other countries different institutional environments brought up better
outcomes 3.
3For further details, see Matolcsy (1991), Branyiczki et al. (1992) for the case of Hungary;
for the case of Poland see Grosfeld and Hare (1991), Puntillo and Ipsen (1996); Czech and
Slovak Republics (Shafil, 1995), Russia (Frydman et al., 1996), Bulgaria (Miller, 2006)
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3.3 Data and preliminary evidence
3.3.1 Data
We source our data from Orbis by Bureau Van Dijk (BVD), which col-
lects financial accounts and other firm-level information on about 372,578
firms that have been active in Ukraine some time until 2015. We assume
the date of incorporation is the birth date of each firm and we keep the
“oblast” where the firm has been active as the location choice of its pro-
ductive activities. Further, we use financial accounts and industrial sec-
tors to characterize firm-level activities.
At first, we validate our sample using the demographics provided
by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (Derzhkomstat). In particular,
Table 3 reports a comparison between the geographic coverage of our
sample and the one provided by the National Statistics Offices. To com-
pare numbers before and after the beginning of the conflict, we report
both years 2013 and 2014 in Table 3. Note that official statistics do not
report for the numbers of firms in AR Crimea and the zone of ATO in
2014, whereas in our dataset they are reported in continuity with bound-
aries before the conflict started. We find an almost perfect match for our
sample, with 0.99 correlation with Derzhkomstat coverage by region.
As expected, Table 3 shows that Kyiv has the largest concentration
of enterprises, with almost a quarter of the total. Dnipropetrivska and
Donetska (7%), Kharkivska and Odeska (6%), Lvivska (5%) regions fol-
low, as these are the regions with the largest number of population. In
columns (4) and (5) of Table 3, we further show the firms that were incor-
porated after 1992. This is the subsample on which we study the location
choice, by 67% of incumbent firms. Looking at the Table 3, the distribu-
tion across regions does not differentiate from overall distribution.
In our analysis, we make use of further controls for characteristics of
the regions. We build an index for the possible language divide catch-
ing the peculiarity of a country whose population is polarized between
Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking. For this purpose, we make
use of data provided by the All-Ukrainian Population Census and Sur-
veys by Rukh Dobrovoltsiv “Prostir Svobody” (2015). We report the per-
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Table 3: Number of Enterprises by Region
Regions
All firms
in sample,
2014
%
of
total
Entering
firms
in sample
%
of
total
All firms in
Derzhkomstat*,
2013
%
of
total
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 13404 3.60 8888 3.54 16228 4.13
Cherkaska 7858 2.11 5353 2.13 7931 2.02
Chernigivska 5732 1.54 4163 1.66 4160 1.06
Chernivetska 4125 1.11 3003 1.20 6220 1.58
Dnipropetrovska 26428 7.09 17596 7.00 28194 7.17
Donetska 25770 6.92 17763 7.07 28731 7.30
Ivano-Frankivska 7108 1.91 5345 2.13 7996 2.03
Kharkivska 24047 6.45 17552 6.99 26086 6.63
Khersonska 7866 2.11 4693 1.87 8104 2.06
Khmelnytska 6906 1.85 4752 1.89 6925 1.76
Kirovogradska 7292 1.96 3914 1.56 7381 1.88
Kyiv 87954 23.61 58011 23.09 86845 22.08
Kyivska 16386 4.40 10975 4.37 18676 4.75
Luganska 10310 2.77 6727 2.68 11385 2.89
Lvivska 17977 4.83 14031 5.59 18762 4.77
Mykolaivska 10363 2.78 5763 2.29 10767 2.74
Odeska 22993 6.17 14942 5.95 26016 6.61
Poltavska 9906 2.66 6394 2.55 10129 2.58
Rivnenska 5128 1.38 3804 1.51 5174 1.32
Sevastopol 3316 0.89 2075 0.83 4288 1.09
Sumska 5672 1.52 4160 1.66 5817 1.48
Ternopilska 4802 1.29 3442 1.37 5234 1.33
Vinnytska 8954 2.40 5848 2.33 9321 2.37
Volynska 5316 1.43 3564 1.42 5511 1.40
Zakarpatska 5946 1.60 3983 1.59 6024 1.53
Zaporizka 14457 3.88 9793 3.90 14777 3.76
Zhytomyrska 6562 1.76 4667 1.86 6645 1.69
Total 372578 100 251201 100 393327 100
*Without Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol and ATO
Source: combined by author based on Bureau Van Dijk (2016), State Statistics Service of Ukraine (2017)
centage of the population using either Ukrainian or Russian as an every-
day language by region. Then, we use an average data on GDP per capita
and population, provided by Derzhkomstat to observe the impact of the
size and richness of the region. Finally, we control for market openness
and size, agglomeration economies, border effect, characteristics of the
local input market according to the existing literature.
Market openness is evaluated by the openness index that is a measure
of country openness and integration on the world economy. We compute
the openness index for regional level, as a ratio of the regional sum of
export and import to GDP of each region:
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OIj =
Exj + Imj
GDPj
(3.1)
where j = 1,...,27 administrative regions in Ukraine; Ex is the exports
and Im is the imports;GDP indicates gross domestic product. Openness
index captures the dependence of domestic producers on external mar-
kets and their trade orientation. The higher is the index, the larger the
influence of trade on domestic activities. Nonetheless, a low level of the
openness index does not always imply high obstacles to foreign trade.
It can be explained by country size and geographic remoteness from po-
tential trading partners4. We expect that regions with a high openness
index will be more attractive to the new investors.
Agglomeration economies have been presented as a key determinant of
location in recent empirical literature (Feldman and Audretsch, 1999).
Specialization in particular industry could be more favorable for busi-
ness because allocation next to all necessary resources could influence
on location choice more than the distance to the consumer market. We
consider Marshallian specialization externalities to find the regional spe-
cialization and we use the production structure specialization index (PS)
pioneered by Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and Paci and Usai (1999),
defined as follows:
PSij =
Nij/
∑
iNij∑
rNij/
∑
i
∑
j Nij
(3.2)
PSij measures the extent to which region j is specialized towards
economic activity i, with the specialization is evaluated with the concen-
tration of technologically and functionally specialized productions.
Then, we capture the degree of a region’s industrial diversity with
Shannon index, defined as:
4The dynamic of Ukrainian economy shows significant changes starting from 2008.
Such changes are driven by a number of external and internal negative factors that are
destabilizing the economic activity. Also, the instability of Ukrainian economy is associ-
ated with high integration in global economy and dependence of Ukrainian producers on
trade in foreign markets. Given that, instability in Ukraine intensifies with higher openness
index.
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PDij = −
j∑
i
Nilog(Ni) (3.3)
where i = 1,...,15 and indicates industries by Nace Rev.2 classification,
with the difference that we grouped eight economic activities into two
groups (BCDE and OSTU); j = 1,...,27 administrative regions in Ukraine;
N is the number of firms. Diversification leads to the establishment of
new firms and penetration into other spheres of economic activity and
the higher it is, the more it leads capital merger and conglomerates cre-
ation.
We control also for the number of characteristics of the local input mar-
ket. We use indicators to measure the average regional salary, unemploy-
ment rate and share of graduate students for the labor market, provided
by Derzhkomstat. We expect that the impact of salary and unemploy-
ment in the region could be twofold. On the one hand, the region as-
sociated with lower salary on average may attract investors seeking for
the cheap labor force, but the high salaries may represent high skilled
employees. On the other hand, the unemployment rate may attract new
firms, because of the high demand at the job market and low proposi-
tion, or discourage them because of very competitive or even rigid labor
market. We expect the positive impact of the share of graduate students
in a given region, since, the population with a higher education should
increase productivity and profitability in a region.
The measure of population is introduced as an agglomeration of con-
sumers, which may increase the attractiveness of a certain region. We
measure the regional stock of infrastructure by the stock of firms for each
year within the regions. Thus, we expect that the higher the number of
firms in a region, the more the region will be attractive to new investors.
Finally, we provide a measure of R&D in a region by the share of industrial
firms with innovations. It is highly possible that the higher technological
knowledge produced in the region should attract more investors.
The geographic peculiarity is measured through the border effect and
language spoken. We expect that the Russian-speaking regions will at-
tract more Russian companies and Ukrainian-speaking regions should
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be more attractive to other foreign investors. Further, we expect that
firms from EU would choose the regions in the West of Ukraine (closer
to EU-border5) and Russian firms will go in the East of the country (closer
to CIS-border6). Finally, firms are expected to be concentrated in the cap-
ital (Kyiv) and its region, because capital usually is more developed and
have more possibilities and connections. The chosen independent vari-
ables are further summarized in Table C4.
3.3.2 Preliminary evidence
An industrial divide
We consider the Krugman specialization index (Krugman, 1991a) as a
measure of the regional specialization. It is given by:
KSIr =
∑
k
|skr − xk| (3.4)
where the index k refers to any industry in the classification by NACE
Rev.2, r to any region in Ukraine. We take the sum of the absolute value
of the differences between the share of industry k’s turnover in the region
r in the total turnover of region r and the share of industry k’s turnover
in total Ukrainian turnover xk.
The index ranges from zero, when a region r has the industrial struc-
ture similar to Ukraine as a whole, until the maximum value of two when
a region’s industrial structure is relatively more concentrated such that
one or more industries are present only in that region (Fig. 16).
In this context, Luganska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, Poltavska regions
and Crimea are more specialized in their own sectors. For example, Lu-
ganska, Poltavska, Zaporizka “oblasti” and Crimea are the areas where
most of the manufacturing industries are located.
5Border with EU-countries (Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland) have follow-
ing regions: Chernivetska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Vinnytska, Volynska, Zakarpatska,
Zhytomyrska, Odeska.
6Border with CIS-countries (Moldova, Belarus, and Russia) have following regions:
Chernigivska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Luganska, Sumska, Volynska, Kyivska, Rivnenska,
and Zhytomyrska.
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Figure 16: Specialization patterns, Krugman specialization index
Language divide
Although Ukraine has only one official language - Ukrainian - minori-
ties, speaking 18 different languages (Rukh Dobrovoltsiv “Prostir Svo-
body”, 2015), are present on its territory. However, the main separation
is among people that belong to the Ukrainian ethnicity (78%) or the Rus-
sian ethnicity (17%), with a residual 5% belonging to other nationalities.
Nonetheless, almost all Ukrainian residents know and are able to use
both Ukrainian and Russian. We expect the presence of a majority of
people preferring one language over the other makes a difference in the
location of productive activities, as the language and the leading culture
can affect the entrepreneurial patterns.
For each region in Table 4, we show the percentage of the population
speaking Ukrainian (column (1)), indifferently Ukrainian and Russian
(column (2)), Russian (column (3)) or other languages (column (4)) in
their everyday routine. Clearly, we find an orientation from West to East
of the country towards a decreasing preference in using Ukrainian as a
daily language7.
7It can be seen from Table 4, that South-East regions are mostly Russian-speaking. This
could be explained by ethnicity of the population (ethnic Ukrainians are only 24% in ARC
and 22% in Sevastopol). In particular, Crimea had been influenced more from the East
than from the West of Ukraine. Moreover, Eastern regions have a more Russian-speaking
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Table 4: Language spoken by regions, % of population
Region Ukrainian Ukrainian & Russian Russian Other
Rivnenska 97 1 2 0
Volynska 97 1 2 0
Ternopilska 96 3 0 1
Lvivska 93 5 2 0
Ivano-Frankivska 92 3 4 1
Zakarpatska 79 11 3 7
Zhytomyrska 79 13 6 2
Khmelnytska 76 15 9 0
Vinnytska 70 5 15 0
Chernivetska 66 24 7 3
Cherkaska 52 25 19 4
Poltavska 47 36 15 2
Chernigivska 27 31 41 1
Kyivska 27 40 32 1
Kirovogradska 25 49 26 0
Sumska 17 51 27 5
Khersonska 11 25 62 2
AR Crimea 10 20 58 12
Donetska 9 14 76 0
Dnipropetrovska 8 32 58 2
Mykolaivska 6 23 71 0
Odeska 6 15 78 1
Kharkivska 4 11 84 1
Zaporizka 3 30 66 1
Luganska 3 8 89 0
Foreign investment divide
Then, we show the presence of the foreign direct investment in the coun-
try. In Fig. 17, we report the revenues of firms that are controlled by par-
ent companies abroad. Approximately 1.7% of companies are foreign-
owned, and they are responsible for 29.5% of total sales of the overall
country.
Geographically, we observe the concentration of FDI activities in the
population with similar circumstances (an ethnic group of Ukrainians is 56% in Donetsk
region, history, and politics), but the most important impact is sharing the border with the
Russian Federation.
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Figure 17: Share of revenues of foreign firms by region
Eastern regions and with exception of Lvivska and Ivano-Frankivska re-
gions in the West. As expected, Kyiv, as the capital, attracts many foreign
investors, although their impact becomes less relevant once we weigh for
revenues generated by investment operations. Indeed, in Kyiv, most of
FDI operations come in small business services.
Once we look at the countries of origin of parent companies, we find
that top investors are Cyprus (32% of foreign subsidiaries), British Vir-
gin Islands (5.9%), Great Britain (5.6%), Germany (5.4%), Russia (4.8%),
and U.S. (4.5%). That is, the first two investing countries are offshore fi-
nancial centers 8. Therefore, the investors may actually come from other
partners or from Ukraine, but they can hide their investment operations.
We will explore more the difference between investments coming from
offshore financial centers and the rest of the world in following analyses.
It is worth noting here that a concentration of investment from offshore
financial centers can be detected in conflict regions. For example, about
68% of foreign subsidiaries in Donetsk are from Cyprus. In Table C5,
we further describe the distribution of offshore investment operations
8 In line with international standards, we define an offshore financial center as a country
that provides financial services to nonresidents on a scale that is incommensurate with the
size and the financing of its domestic economy. For further details, see Zorome (2007), IMF
WP/07/87
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by region and their relevance on overall FDI operations. The numbers re-
ported in Table C5 analyses can be compared to VoxUkraine (Ostapchuk,
2016) in 2016, according to which Ukraine has 1,689 firms. Apparently,
we have a slightly higher number of companies (2,227 firms), but our
sample is related to 2014.
3.4 Empirical strategy
To answer our research question, where economic activities locate in
Ukraine before the international conflict, we take the baseline alternative-
specific conditional logit model and compare with other location choice
models in the literature (Head et al., 1995; McFadden, 1973). The pro-
bit model (Table C7) and the most simple conditional logit model are
exploited to compare our results.
3.4.1 Alternative-specific conditional logit model
The baseline of our analysis of location choices by firms is estimated by
McFadden (1973) model. The alternative-specific model allows us to es-
timate the preferences of firm’s choice over the baseline. We describe the
model as follows.
We have a set of regions R = 27 (alternatives). Let yir, where r =
1, ..., R be a choice of firm i (case). That is, yir = 1 if firm i choose region
r and yir = 0 otherwise. The independent variables come in two forms:
alternative specific and case specific. We have p alternative-specific vari-
ables (language, regions now in conflict, population, GDP per capita,
borders with EU and CIS) so that for firm i we have a R×p matrix Xi (in
our case 27× 5).
Further, we have q case-specific variables (age, foreign, offshore, lead-
ing sector) so that we have a vector 1× q vector Zi for firm i.
Our random utility model is:
Ui = Xiβ + (ZiA)
′ + i (3.5)
Here is β is a p×1 vector of alternative-specific regression coefficients
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and A = (α1, ..., αR) is a q × R matrix of case-specific regression coeffi-
cients. We set αk = 0, where k is Odesa region. The region r chosen by
firm i is the one that maximizes utility. Vector Ui quantifies the utility
that firm gains from R regions.
Therefore, we have 251,201 firms (cases) and 27 regions (alternatives)
for a total of 6,782,427 observations. We take the Odesa region as the
reference alternative since its regional GDP is the closest to median value
(i.e., 31,268 UAH per person).
Thus, we compare the estimated results of the alternative-specific
conditional logit model with the results of the conditional logit model
in Table 5. As expected, column (1) shows that the increase of population
and GDP per capita in a given region affects positively the attractiveness
of region, although we add additional control variables. The regions now
in conflict seems to discourage firms to locate there their economic activ-
ities and although, with the addition of control variables this effect is de-
creasing, it is still significant. In column (1), the language variable is not
significant. This result can be associated with the inclusion of additional
variables, such as borders with EU and CIS, and also, regions now in con-
flict. As the regions with EU-border are mostly Ukrainian-speaking and
regions now in conflict are more Russian-speaking, these variables can
have a confounding effect as the language used alone in the total impact.
Thus, we observe that the regions with EU-border will attract more in-
vestors, while regions now in conflict will discourage potential investor
to start their business in these regions.
Thus, from the obtained results in Table 5, the negative Language co-
efficient of -0.846 means that if the region is Ukrainian-speaking, then the
probability of location choice for that region decreases. The same nega-
tive effect we see for the GDP in the region. Note that our expectation
on the location closer to the borders is confirmed. Thus, firms choose not
only by geographic allocation but also by markets, partners, location,
customers, etc. Being next to the border means the reduction of costs
for transportation, more possibilities at the labor market and sometimes
special border tariffs agreements.
Table C6 provides the results of the alternative-specific conditional
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Table 5: Location choice
(1) (2)
Clogit Asclogit
Language 0.00112 -0.846∗∗∗
(0.00536) (-0.123)
(Log) Population 0.758∗∗∗ 0.224
(0.00714) (-0.154)
(Log) GDP per capita 1.229∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗
(0.00616) (-0.125)
Regions now in conflict -0.149∗∗∗ 0.0844
(0.00712) (-0.157)
Border with EU 0.273∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗
(0.00613) (-0.128)
Border with CIS 0.00560 1.009∗∗∗
(0.00482) (-0.138)
Number of Observations 6782427 6782427
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
logit model, showing that older firms choose regions in West, AR Crimea
and Luganska “oblast” with a higher probability than the Odesa region.
Further, it can be seen that relatively young firms locate in Kyiv-city and
its region. Looking at companies’ age in Kyiv, we find that new (espe-
cially small) firms will choose the capital-city to enter the Ukrainian mar-
ket. This can be motivated by the fact that usually in the capital region
will be a highly concentrated pool of customers and suppliers with more
possibilities to establish a new partnership and to attract investors (es-
pecially foreign one). The foreign firms choose only Kyiv, AR Crimea
(including Sevastopol), Kharkivska and Luganska regions over the base
region. Comparing to other regions, Odeska “oblast” attracts more FDI,
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as this region has a very particular location. It has the exit to the sea,
borders with EU and CIS countries, and also, air connection (airport).
Offshore firms have a higher probability to establish their economic ac-
tivities in Kyiv and its region, and also, in Sumska and Dnipropetrovska
regions. The “leading sector” variable (firm is specialized in the same
sector, which has the largest share of total revenues in the region) shows
that firms will choose those regions over the Odeska “oblast”.
3.4.2 Postestimation
Based on previous estimates of the alternative-specific conditional logit
model, we calculate the predicted probabilities of the location of each
firm in a given region. Then, we combine the results by the incorporation
date focusing on: the probabilities of location in regions now in conflict
and the others; the probabilities of location choice in Ukrainian-speaking
and Russian-speaking regions.
Figure 18: Predicted Probabilities,
Regions now in conflict
Figure 19: Predicted Probabilities,
Language divide
Donetsk, Lugansk, and ARC (including Sevastopol) regions started to
have problems with the attraction of new business activities even before
the international conflict. Thus, Fig. 18 illustrates that, in 1992, the av-
erage probability of firm’s location choice in the regions now in conflict
was 0.038 versus 0.037 for regions without conflict, while the probability
of location in 2000 was 0.037 for all regions. After 2000, the probability for
Donetsk, Lugansk, and ARC (including Sevastopol) started to decrease
and, in 2014, it was 0.007 versus 0.042 (for the other 23 regions).
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Moreover, we observe that the Russian-speaking regions stopped to
attract new investments more than six years ago. Thus, Fig. 19 shows
that the probability of the firm allocation in Ukrainian-speaking region
in 1992 was lower compared to the probability of allocation in Russian-
speaking region. This situation changed in 2007 when the probability
of firm’s establishment was about 0.037 overall Ukraine. In 2014, there
is total change with Ukrainian-speaking regions having a probability of
location choice higher than Russian-speaking regions.
We argue this phenomenon with the way of governance, which is
associated with the change of the president, parliament, and way of pol-
icymaking. The switching point could be related to the effect of the pri-
vatization process, an important economic reform in Ukraine during the
1992-2008 and, which is ongoing. The transition to a market economy
had a significant impact on new investors, as it implied the risk to lose
the firm in case of insufficient fulfillment the requirements9 of privatiza-
tion policy.
Moreover, the privatization had a historical impact. The Western re-
gions have not been under the influence of the communist regime as
long, as the Eastern ones. Thus, we presume the European legacy had
a stronger impact on the privatization process in the West, and the East
has been facing some similar patterns of the privatization process in post-
soviet countries.
Indeed, the results for regions now in conflict report that Donbas and
Crimea (regions that historically had more influence from Russia) had a
significant increase of the probability of location choice only during the
second stage of privatization (mass or “voucher” privatization), in 1995-
1998. During this stage, a lot of enterprises were privatized through a
mechanism similar to Russian mass privatization (Frydman et al., 1996).
9It includes further requirements: if investors satisfy the requirements of the contract,
they have a right to further purchase shares of governmental ownership; at the auction, at
the same time more than one stake of the technologically connected enterprises could be
sold; in case of not satisfying requirements of the contract, shares should be returned to
the government; further alienation of any part of shares is forbidden until complete imple-
mentation of the sale. In these conditions, big clusters concentrated in the ownership of
the small group of people, who did not allow new investors to enter the market (especially
metallurgy and mining sectors).
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On the one hand, the legacy of the Soviet past had a significant in-
fluence on the Eastern regions, especially because of the socialist indus-
trialization legacy and heavy industries. These regions had the insuf-
ficient distribution of industries and were based on planned develop-
ment rather than economic efficiency. Thus, after the collapse of the So-
viet Union, more Eastern regions left with a certain socialist mentality
that influenced the privatization mechanism in these regions. Another
key factor leading to regions in conflict not being attractive anymore is
that, from 1998, Ukrainian government suspended the sales of firms that
could increase the number of investors, such as strategic enterprises, i.e.,
firms of heavy industries and energy sector that are located mostly in
the East. Furthermore, the creation of oligopoly (Guriev and Rachinsky,
2005) in the East decreased the probability for new firms to enter the
market.
On the other hand, Western regions lead in terms of agriculture, farm-
ing, and forestry production combined with more democratic and Euro-
pean experience of using the vouchers during the privatization. Also,
Western regions had different effect after the second stage of privatiza-
tion, because the borders with European countries, together with the less
post-communist social context, attracted more FDI.
We are also interested in understanding if including additional vari-
ables, which are used in the literature for estimation of location choice
models, will validate the results obtained with the previous analysis.
3.4.3 Conditional logit model in period 2001-2014
Since we have some variables available only from 2001, we show another
estimation including all variables to see how results are changed. We
report the results of the conditional logit model for different subsets of
data occurring on the period 2001-2014 for all the firms in the sample. As
we are interested in observing the location behavior of different groups
of firms, we apply our model considering Ukrainian firms only, firms
with foreign ownership (excluding offshore financial zones) only and,
finally, only firms with offshore ownership. The results are reported in
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Table 6.
Table 6: Location Choice of Firms in Ukraine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
General Ukrainian Foreign Offshore
Specialization index (zPS) 0.243*** 0.271*** 0.437*** 0.367***
(0.00234) (0.00656) (0.0254) (0.0210)
Diversification index (zPD) 0.0342*** 0.0330** 0.112* -0.108*
(0.00476) (0.0143) (0.0659) (0.0571)
Regions now in conflict -0.0951*** -0.510*** -1.015*** -0.0710
(0.0183) (0.0572) (0.321) (0.239)
Language -0.0895*** 0.159*** 0.144 0.227
(0.0146) (0.0408) (0.196) (0.165)
Population 0.456*** 0.793*** 2.166*** 0.755**
(0.0291) (0.0852) (0.439) (0.356)
Stock of Firms 0.546*** 0.411*** -0.379 0.737***
(0.0243) (0.0663) (0.294) (0.279)
Unemployment rate -0.00672*** 0.0132* 0.0111 -0.0908***
(0.00243) (0.00700) (0.0319) (0.0299)
Salary 0.301*** 0.367*** -0.758 -0.485
(0.0452) (0.117) (0.580) (0.515)
Share of Students 15.65*** 17.63*** 39.19*** 26.33***
(0.740) (1.958) (8.303) (7.284)
Openness Index -0.0780 0.125 4.218*** 1.784*
(0.0889) (0.263) (0.971) (0.968)
Share of Industrial Firms
with Innovations
1.021*** 0.454*** 0.273 0.207
(0.0506) (0.153) (0.789) (0.655)
Border with CIS-countries 0.0642*** 0.128*** -0.412*** 0.214*
(0.0101) (0.0279) (0.127) (0.116)
Border with EU-countries 0.110*** -0.0246 0.466*** 0.0395
(0.0124) (0.0356) (0.168) (0.153)
Capital Region 0.394*** 0.186*** 2.093*** 0.300
(0.0242) (0.0677) (0.280) (0.272)
Pseudo R2 0.1705 0.1444 0.3887 0.3206
Number of Observations 3,541,428 370,413 31,941 31,617
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Column (1) shows that in the whole sample the probability of firm lo-
cation in one region increases with an increase in the specialization index
(PS), while the probability is less significant if the diversification index
(PD) is considered. Regions now in conflict and the Ukrainian speaking
regions resulted to be less attractive, while the increase of the popula-
tion and the stock of firms, attract more investments. The impact of the
unemployment rate, level of salary, the share of students, and R&D in a
given region confirms our expectations that investors are seeking for the
skilled labor force, and also, for regions characterized by higher educa-
tion and innovation potential. Moreover, the probability to locate in the
capital city and in Kyivska “oblast” is relatively high for all investors,
because these two regions are a big hub of economic development and
potential.
In columns (2)-(4) of Table 6, we show the results of separate regres-
sions obtained considering domestic (column (2)) and non-domestic in-
vestors (columns (3)-(4)). Findings for domestic firms (column (2)) are
consistent with the literature on location choice (Belderbos and Carree,
2002; Halvorsen, 2012; Hilber and Voicu, 2010). We observe a signifi-
cance of PS-index and PD-index, which means that domestic firms will
make their decisions in line with their specialization and with respect
to the industrial diversity of the region. Moreover, more populated re-
gions are more attractive for Ukrainian investors if the stock of firms
(preferably domestic) is already present there. The results of the con-
ditional logit model also confirm our expectations on the impact of av-
erage salary, which is significantly positive, showing that domestic firm
will seek high-skilled labor force while preferring regions with the higher
unemployment rate.
In column (3), we show the findings on the location choice for the sub-
set of foreign firms. The specialization of the region become even more
important for foreign investors, while the diversification is less signifi-
cant. We find interesting results with respect to the language measure, as
language does not have a significant impact on foreign firms’ choice. We
observe high coefficients for regional market openness and share of stu-
dents in a region, which confirm our intuition for an impact on regional
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attractiveness for FDI of these factors. The allocation next to the border
will have a positive effect if the regions with a border with EU (mostly
West of Ukraine) and opposite effect for regions next to CIS-countries.
In column (4), we report the results of estimation on the offshore firms
(firms that are registered in offshore financial zones) sample. We find
interesting peculiarities in the location of offshore firms. For example,
the PD-index has a negative correlation to the location choice, while the
PS-index, stock of firms and population measures have a positive sig-
nificance for location choice of offshore firms, repeating the pattern of
domestic firms. The main differences in results between offshore and
foreign firms are related to the measure of unemployment and the loca-
tion in the capital and its region. In particular, in the case of offshore
companies, the measure of unemployment is associated with a negative
coefficient, meaning that a high unemployment rate will discourage the
location of offshore firms in a given region. The location in the capital
and its region seems to be not significant, while it is significant for for-
eign firms. Additionally, the share of students and innovations in a given
region increases the probability.
Moreover, language tends to affect more the location choice of do-
mestic firms, which will prefer to establish a new economic activity in
Ukrainian speaking region. We notice that foreign and offshore firms
will go in the regions with a higher openness index because trade is the
key determinant for investors. Furthermore, regions located next to CIS-
countries will more attract domestic and offshore firms, while the pres-
ence of CIS border will decrease the probability of choice of foreign firms.
Regions that shares borders with the European Union will have a high
probability of a foreign investor to establish a new economic activity.
We can conclude that our considerations on foreign and offshore firms
in Ukraine are significant and robust. The impact of language divide may
become not significant when we control for the presence of the border in
a given region.
66
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study the determinants of the location choice of firms
in Ukraine in the period after its independence and before the annexa-
tion of Crimea and Russian armed aggression in Donbas. We argue that
the possible key driver of the location behavior of economic activities in
Ukraine can be related to the effect of the privatization process, impor-
tant economic reform in Ukraine.
We argue that the regions now in conflict (the part of Donbas and
Crimea) stopped to attract new business activities long before (right af-
ter 1998) the conflict started. These results can be associated with the
second stage of the privatization process (mass privatization). Moreover,
firms located in Donetsk and Lugansk regions produce the specific group
of goods, which make these regions strategically important for national
development. The analysis showed that language divide started to affect
the investment decisions of entrepreneurs only after the global financial
crisis. In particular, after 2007, firms were located more in regions with a
Ukrainian speaking population.
Our findings on the location of firms by foreign divide show that off-
shore companies are located more in the East and, especially, in the con-
flict regions. Furthermore, we employ a conditional logit model to cap-
ture what is the location choice of firms within regions in Ukraine during
2001-2014. We find that firms will choose to locate their economic activ-
ities in the regions with a higher share of innovations combined with
more skilled employees and with a higher openness to trade. European
border plays a prominent role in the location of foreign firms. The find-
ings on the effect of CIS borders show that closeness to CIS-countries
has a positive effect on domestic firms only, while it has a negative effect
on foreign firms. The specialization externalities always show a positive
effect for all firms. In particular, new firms prefer to go in the region
with more specialized production. Note that specialization may depend
on the characteristics of the region itself, such as natural resources and
specifically trained employees.
The regional diversity has an impact not only on the macroeconomic
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situation of the country but also on attracting new FDI and local invest-
ments.
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Appendix C
In Table C1 we also report the coverage of our sample by industry and
confront it with Derzhkomstat figures. In this case, our sample correlates
very well with official statistics figures.
Table C1: Sample coverage by industry
All firms
in sample, 2014 % of total
All firms in
Derzhkomstat*, 2013 % of total
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A) 46782 13% 46012 13%
Manufacturing (B, C, D, E) 49039 13% 42187 12%
Construction (F) 33586 9% 29785 9%
Wholesale and retail trade;
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (G) 109907 30% 93972 28%
Transporting and storage (H) 14837 4% 14909 4%
Accommodation and food service activities (I) 9662 3% 7885 2%
Information and communication (J) 14242 4% 13319 4%
Financial and insurance activities (K) 5576 2% 4410 1%
Real estate activities (L) 24408 7% 31201 9%
Professional, scientific and technical activities (M) 31785 9% 30028 9%
Administrative and support service activities (N) 16829 5% 15177 4%
Education (P) 2157 1% 2081 1%
Human health and social work activities (Q) 4907 1% 4093 1%
Arts, entertainment and recreation (R) 2678 1% 1946 1%
Other personal service activities (O, S, T, U) 5042 1% 3996 1%
Total (NACE Rev.2) 371437 100% 341001 100%
*Without Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol and ATO
Source: combined by author based on Bureau Van Dijk (2016), State Statistics Service of Ukraine (2017).
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Table C2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(Log) Age 251201 2.562924 .3258406 0 3.135494
(Log) GDP per capita 251201 9.939785 .5990234 9.038577 10.93169
(Log) Population 251201 7.663191 .4413171 5.941263 8.421196
Table C3: Descriptive statistics for the variables in the period 2001-2014
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
zPS 131164 .0051097 1.003364 -2.909385 5.838013
zPD 131164 .0697848 .9788354 -1.540696 2.867805
(Log) Population 131177 7.694403 .4245571 5.935891 8.484898
Stock of Firms 131177 10.03743 1.025811 7.825645 12.00298
Openness Index 131177 .1479138 .0665784 .0159968 .2709088
Salary 131177 6.680581 .6170864 5.468271 10.56054
Unemployment rate 131177 7.184931 2.663649 3.1 16.1
Share of Industrial Firms
with Innovations 131177 6.120608 .4065431 4.29046 6.749931
Share of Students 131177 3.138635 1.133134 .6825588 4.947866
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Table C4: Variables Definitions
Variable Definition
Language 1 if the population is more Ukrainian-speaking more, 0 - if Russian
(Log) Population log of average number of population in a given region
(Log) GDP per capita log of average GDP per capita in a given region
Regions now in conflict 1 if the region belongs to the territory of Ukrainian-Russian conflict and 0 otherwise
Border with EU 1 if the region share the border with EU-countries and 0 otherwise
Border with CIS 1 if the region share the border with CIS-countries and 0 otherwise
Age log of the firm’s age (the difference between 2015 and the year of incorporation)
Foreign 1 when company has owner different from Ukraine and 0 otherwise
Offshore 1 when company has a country of origin that belongs to the official offshore zoneand 0 otherwise
Leading Sectors 1 when the firm belongs to the leading sector in a given region and 0 otherwise
zPS standardized value of production structure specialization index
zPD standardized value of production structure diversification index
Stock of Firms log of the cumulative number of firms within the region
Population log of population in a given region
Unemployment rate regional unemployment rate
Salary log of average salary in the region
Openness Index exports plus imports/to the regional GDP
Share of Industrial Firms
with Innovations number of industrial firms with innovations total number of firms in region
Share of Students number of students/total population in region
Capital Region 1 if the region is Kyiv or Kyivska, 0 otherwise
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Table C5: Number of offshore companies
Region Amount ofoffshore firms
% from all
FDI in region
% from all
FDI in Ukraine
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 68 61.82% 1.56%
Cherkaska 39 52.70% 0.90%
Chernigivska 38 67.86% 0.87%
Chernivetska 10 52.63% 0.23%
Dnipropetrovska 174 61.05% 3.99%
Donetska 212 75.44% 4.87%
Ivano-Frankivska 27 48.21% 0.62%
Kharkivska 74 52.48% 1.70%
Khersonska 25 47.17% 0.57%
Khmelnytska 35 59.32% 0.80%
Kirovogradska 23 74.19% 0.53%
Kyiv 822 45.79% 18.87%
Kyivska 110 44.18% 2.52%
Luganska 42 56.00% 0.96%
Lvivska 64 34.97% 1.47%
Mykolaivska 32 53.33% 0.73%
Odeska 109 55.33% 2.50%
Poltavska 55 53.92% 1.26%
Rivnenska 16 42.11% 0.37%
Sevastopol 9 37.50% 0.21%
Sumska 51 79.69% 1.17%
Ternopilska 16 44.44% 0.37%
Vinnytska 43 65.15% 0.99%
Volynska 28 58.33% 0.64%
Zakarpatska 21 20.59% 0.48%
Zaporizka 54 61.36% 1.24%
Zhytomyrska 30 46.15% 0.69%
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Table C6: Regional choice
Age Foreign Offshore Leading Sector Observations
West
Chernivetska 0.612*** (-0.0671) -0.0995 (-0.0608) -0.753** (-0.349) 0.0831* (-0.0448) 6,782,427
Ivano Frankivska 0.686*** (-0.0534) -0.145*** (-0.0481) -0.383* (-0.232) 0.156*** (-0.0354) 6,782,427
Khmelnytska 0.265*** (-0.053) -0.255*** (-0.0491) 0.134 (-0.2) -1.044*** (-0.0498) 6,782,427
Lvivska 0.666*** (-0.0384) -0.193*** (-0.0358) -0.383** (-0.164) 0.233*** (-0.0261) 6,782,427
Rivnenska 0.419*** (-0.0585) -0.457*** (-0.0505) -0.429 (-0.278) -0.441*** (-0.0457) 6,782,427
Ternopilska 0.650*** (-0.0628) -0.452*** (-0.0523) -0.322 (-0.278) -0.0715 (-0.0437) 6,782,427
Volynska 0.471*** (-0.0602) -0.442*** (-0.052) 0.184 (-0.221) 0.323*** (-0.0402) 6,782,427
Zakarpatska 0.805*** (-0.0606) -0.338*** (-0.0509) -0.196 (-0.246) 0.0482 (-0.0402) 6,782,427
North
Chernigivska 0.474*** (-0.0571) -0.339*** (-0.0503) 0.288 (-0.2) -0.700*** (-0.0473) 6,782,427
Kyiv -0.620*** (-0.028) 0.0747** (-0.0293) 0.589*** (-0.108) 0.234*** (-0.0207) 6,782,427
Kyivska -0.115*** (-0.0383) -0.132*** (-0.0388) 0.305** (-0.143) 0.201*** (-0.0279) 6,782,427
Sumska 0.506*** (-0.0574) -0.304*** (-0.0508) 0.569*** (-0.181) -0.988*** (-0.0518) 6,782,427
Zhytomyrska 0.440*** (-0.0539) -0.490*** (-0.0466) -0.201 (-0.232) -0.0785** (-0.0387) 6,782,427
Center
Cherkaska 0.300*** (-0.0506) -0.351*** (-0.046) -0.00218 (-0.202) -0.541*** (-0.0408) 6,782,427
Dnipropetrovska 0.02 (-0.0344) -0.0371 (-0.0351) 0.219* (-0.131) 0.546*** (-0.0242) 6,782,427
Kirovogradska 0.549*** (-0.0591) -0.350*** (-0.0512) -0.231 (-0.251) -0.599*** (-0.0471) 6,782,427
Poltavska 0.360*** (-0.0481) -0.219*** (-0.0447) 0.0931 (-0.182) -0.744*** (-0.0402) 6,782,427
Vinnytska 0.305*** (-0.0488) -0.355*** (-0.0446) 0.0182 (-0.193) 0.310*** (-0.0336) 6,782,427
South
AR Crimea 0.613*** (-0.045) 0.568*** (-0.0492) -0.567*** (-0.2) -1.045*** (-0.0385) 6,782,427
Khersonska 0.380*** (-0.0543) -0.0447 (-0.0521) -0.468* (-0.251) 0.187*** (-0.0369) 6,782,427
Mykolaivska 0.206*** (-0.0493) -0.0592 (-0.0482) -0.217 (-0.209) -0.667*** (-0.041) 6,782,427
Sevastopol 0.0438 (-0.0751) 0.510*** (-0.0892) -1.971*** (-0.715) -0.706*** (-0.0644) 6,782,427
Zaporizka 0.278*** (-0.0414) -0.114*** (-0.0401) -0.288 (-0.178) -0.686*** (-0.0338) 6,782,427
East
Donetska 0.448*** (-0.0355) -0.121*** (-0.0344) 0.198 (-0.132) 0.404*** (-0.0244) 6,782,427
Kharkivska 0.134*** (-0.035) 0.0675* (-0.0357) -0.563*** (-0.159) -0.562*** (-0.0275) 6,782,427
Luganska 0.618*** (-0.0491) 0.179*** (-0.0484) -0.488** (-0.218) -0.558*** (-0.0375) 6,782,427
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Probit model
We use a probit model to check if the similar determinants have a similar
effect on foreign and offshore firms. We stress offshore firms, as it is
peculiar for Ukraine as the way of doing business in a country.
Table C7 shows the findings of the probit model. The main result is
that the probability to choose regions now in conflict and regions based
on the language pattern (for foreign and offshore firms) is persistent even
if we use additional control variables. Thus, we can confirm our expecta-
tion, i.e., offshore firms have different ownership (different from foreign,
for example, it can be the domestic owner, who registered firm in off-
shore) and are driven by different factors from the general pattern for
foreign firms.
Table C7: Probit model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regions now in conflict Language Regions now in conflict Language
Foreign -0.558∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(-11.53) (18.26) (-4.77) (8.78)
Offshore 0.383∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ 0.203∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(6.19) (-7.38) (2.41) (-3.42)
(Log) Population 1.606∗∗∗ -2.095∗∗∗
(157.98) (-238.66)
(Log) GDP per capita -2.061∗∗∗ 1.899∗∗∗
(-127.17) (235.54)
Border with CIS 0.122∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗
(13.88) (-42.44)
Border with EU 1.320∗∗∗
(168.71)
Constant -1.071∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 6.927∗∗∗ -2.798∗∗∗
(-343.10) (59.68) (56.92) (-43.80)
Number of Observations 251254 251254 201715 251254
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
When we add the controls for population, gross regional product and
border effect, there is a higher probability to observe the activities of
the foreign firm in regions that do not have a conflict and preferably
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Ukrainian-speaking, although the coefficients decreased from -0.558 to
-0.316 for regions in conflict. A similar decrease can also be noticed for
regions by language divide (from 0.586 to 0.343).
For offshore firms, we observe the opposite effect, as the regions now
in conflict are more attractive as well as Russian-speaking regions. The
coefficients also decrease (from 0.383 to 0.203 for regions now in conflict,
and -0.322 and 0.183 for language divide) with additional controls, but
still are significant in probability.
Moreover, the results of the probit model show that FDI was mostly
choosing regions closer to the border with EU-countries, while the off-
shore firms were located mostly in the East and North of the country.
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Chapter 4
Organizing the Global
Value Chains: the case of
Ukraine
4.1 Introduction
In times of globalization, the new trade agreements arise, and the cross-
borders boundaries decrease. As a consequence, it makes a significant
impact on the firm’s development and investment, which involves a wide
network of affiliates with diverse production stages. Now, not only the
research and development, production of parts, but also recruitment and
marketing, design and sales can be fragmented across the firms and even
countries. Multinational companies together with their affiliates consist
a large share of worldwide production, and it is important to understand
their upstream or downstream position on the supply chain.
In this chapter, we follow the definition of upstream production, as
the production of goods that will locate at the beginning of the supply
chain and will be used in the different stages of input of other products.
We define the downstream production, as the production of goods that
will locate close to the end of the value chain and will be intended for the
final consumer.
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The aim of this contribution is to test the organization of global value
chain at the firm-level in Ukraine by foreign and domestic multinational
companies (MNEs). As global value chains (GVCs) have become an im-
portant component of the global economy, we argue that it is essential
for Ukraine to meet the requirements and challenges of the regional eco-
nomic integration with other countries through bilateral and multilateral
trade and economic development.
The research on GVCs aspect in Ukraine is a very interesting topic, as
the country had and still has some difficulties related to the trade and in-
vestment barriers. According to GVCs development, Ukraine decreased
its ranking in the international list in one year for six positions (85 out
of 138 in 2016-2017 versus 79 in 2014-2015 (Schwab, 2016a)). Thus, it is
important to understand the current situation of Ukraine in the global
supply chains and to provide possible recommendations to improve the
situation.
Note that GVCs also provide an expansion of export in a country.
Firms can be easily concentrated on one specific production, in which
they have competitive advantages. Considering this, the small firms also
can become competitive in the international market and fully participate
in GVCs. For example, Ukraine is positioning in GVCs as leading ex-
porter of finished iron goods, iron ore, wheat, corn, barley and seed oil.
Moreover, the FDI in Ukraine is concentrated more in metallurgy, where
the final goods are sold in the global market. Thus, we expect the affil-
iates in Ukraine to be more downstream, although it is a resource-rich
country with a relatively cheap cost of intermediate production.
Furthermore, this chapter improves on the existing empirical litera-
ture on GVCs in at least two ways. We build a unique firm-level sample
using the data on 15,584 firms active in Ukraine until 2014. It is the first
time when the empirical analysis on the organization of GVCs is made
for Ukraine with the firm-level data. Moreover, we investigate the im-
pact of parent downstreamness on affiliates and in particular, we show
the results on the positioning of successive investments along the sup-
ply chain. We observe that the foreign multinational companies control
fewer affiliates (only around 7% of total number of affiliates in Ukraine)
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than the domestic parents.
One of our main findings is that the multinational companies which
establish affiliates in Ukraine are already more downstream. Nonethe-
less, we find that with an increase in the number of affiliates in the group,
the firms lead to be even more vertically integrated. Another key point
that the foreign multinational companies will have subsidiaries, which
are oriented more close to the intermediate production, while the do-
mestic MNEs will locate their economic activities closer to the final con-
sumer.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 re-
views the literature. Section 4.3 presents the construction of data sample.
In Section 4.4, we show estimated results and robustness check. Section
4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Nowadays, the unbundling process leads to a fragmentation of produc-
tion process of final good among different firms, while before, the pro-
ducers preferred to implement the full cycle of good on their own. Note
that the production process has different stages and with an increase of
the international dispersion of GVCs, these stages can also be located in
different economies. Thus, intermediate inputs will be produced in one
country and then exported to other countries, until then it will reach the
final consumer.
Already back in 80’s, different works studied the fragmentation of
production. For example, Dixit and Grossman (1982) analyzed the multi-
stage vertical production, where some value is added to intermediate in-
put and ready for the next stage. Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) focused
on the process of fragmentation at the international level. Yeats (1997)
analyzed the global production sharing. Feenstra (1998) argued that the
increase of worldwide integration has led to disintegration in the produc-
tion process, where activities can be located domestically or outsourced
abroad for higher profitability. Hummels et al. (2001) presented a ver-
tical specialization because production processes increasingly involve a
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sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across many countries, with
each country specializing in particular stages of a goods production se-
quence. de Backer and Yamano (2011) described increasing importance
of GVCs in times of international production and trade, where different
stages of production are located across different economies and growing
spread of international production networks.
Consequently, the supply contracts evolved with spreading the idea
of the supply chains in production. There are two possible ways of pro-
ducing the good. On the one hand, all production can be done within
the same firm: firstly, the parent creates a subsidiary and then, delegates
the further stages of production to it. On the other hand, a company
signs the contract with an external supplier, which is totally indepen-
dent of a given firm. Although the first kind of relations is more strong
than a contract, not every firm can proceed with it. Thus, considering
the necessity of supply contracts, Acemoglu et al. (2007) were the first,
who studied the possibility of signing contracts with several suppliers by
headquarters. They show that greater contractual incompleteness leads
to the adoption of less advanced technologies. Moreover, further work
of Acemoglu et al. (2009) found greater vertical integration in countries
that have both greater contracting costs and greater financial develop-
ment more favorable financial environment.
Also, in the series of works Baldwin (2006), Baldwin (2011) and Bald-
win (2016), the author studied the new paradigm of globalization and
unbundling process. He argued that probably the most important as-
pect of contemporary globalization is a second unbundling when pro-
duction stages previously performed in close proximity across national
borders are dispersed to reduce production costs. The study of Baldwin
and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) provides a portrait of the global pattern of
supply-chain trade with help of World Input-Output Database. Finally,
elementary theory of global supply chains was developed by Costinot
et al. (2013). They also made a first look at how vertical specialization
shapes the interdependence of nations.
Another key factor for integrating stages is the elasticity of substitu-
tion of the intermediate supplier. Antra`s and Chor (2013) argued whether
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inputs are sequential complements or sequential substitutes turns out to
be determined only by whether the elasticity of final-good demand is (re-
spectively) higher or lower than the “technological” elasticity of substitu-
tion among inputs. For GVCs the elasticity of substitution has particular
importance, as a high elasticity considers ease of substitution one pro-
ducer with another in the total supply chain of the good, while the low
elasticity signals the difficulties with replacing the particular intermedi-
ate producer. Thus, among others, Alfaro et al. (2017) found whether a
firm integrates suppliers located upstream or downstream depends cru-
cially on the size of the elasticity of demand faced by the firm. To sum-
marize, the more firm is upstream and the more unique good it produces,
the more it is difficult to substitute such firm in the supply chain, as it can
stop all the process of the production from its early stages.
Furthermore, our study can contribute to the literature on the firm-
level analysis of affiliates allocation along the supply chain with respect
to the parents at the case-specific (Ukraine), whereas study of del Prete
and Rungi (2017) test at the firm level the optimal allocation of owner-
ship rights along a productive sequence and find new insights for firm-
level heterogeneity along supply chains of affiliates that operate in 185
countries. The recommendations for Ukraine on effective integration
into the global value chains were described by Guzhva (2015). Consid-
ering Taglioni and Winkler (2016), it is important to study participation
of the country in GVCs, as it leads to the increase of competitiveness
and to the efficient development. Another important study in line with
our research is Rungi and del Prete (2017), where the authors detect a
non-linear U-shaped relationship between the value added generated by
firms and their position on a productive sequence.
Moreover, we analyze the dataset based on the foreign and domestic
MNEs, which locate their subsidiaries in Ukraine. We define the affil-
iates as upstream or downstream with respect to parents based on re-
cent studies. Thus, a stream of literature on downnstreamness divides into
two parts, the literature on upstream and downstream location along the
supply chain. Antra`s et al. (2012) argue that upstreamness indicates the
product at the beginning of production line on the supply chain, which
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is going through different stages of input of other products. Already in
further work, Antra`s and Chor (2013), authors show that the incentive to
integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative position (up-
stream versus downstream) at which the supplier enters the production
line. Also, they developed the downstreamness metrics, which we use in
our further estimations.
It is necessary to mention that multinational firms use two ways of
strategic organization, either vertical or horizontal integration. The bulk
of literature distinguish the strategy of horizontal integration for foreign
investment to mean situating production facilities so as to avoid trade
costs (Brainard, 1993; Markusen, 1984) and the strategy of vertical inte-
gration represents firms attempts to take advantage of cross-border fac-
tor cost differences (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The
results of vertical integration are presented in work of Atalay et al. (2014),
who find that vertical ownership is not primarily motivated by facilitat-
ing the efficient intra-firm transfers of goods along a production chain.
Following our question, our interest is to estimate the role of Ukraine
in GVCs, because as it is a relatively cheap European country with rich
resources, it has a high probability to play a crucial role in global sup-
ply chains. Moreover, it is necessary to understand what is upstream or
downstream country. The World Bank (2014) defines upstream countries,
as countries that are associated with the production of raw materials (in-
volved in the first stage of production), while the downstream countries
are specialized in processed products or customer services. The recent
study of Cingolani et al. (2017) suggested that while emerging and de-
veloping countries tend to secure central positions at upstream and mid-
stream production stages, high-income countries tend to exert prevail-
ing roles at downstream stages. Moreover, the comparative advantages
of countries were studied by Dai (2013), who found that while the ad-
vanced economies continue to dominate tasks at the upstream of supply
chains and the emerging economies remain prominent in downstream
tasks like assembly, participation in global supply chains has been dy-
namic over time.
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4.3 Data and preliminary evidence
We use the dataset from Orbis by Moody’s Analytics on firms active in
Ukraine till 2014. It collects firm-level data on financial accounts, when
available, incorporation dates and investor’s country of origin. More-
over, we use the global ultimate owner code as the identification of par-
ent company (headquarter) and then, we build the network of affiliates,
whose economic activity is controlled by a parent company.
We can sequence our sample with the information on the first invest-
ment and successive investments on the basis of date of incorporation.
We obtain the subset of 7,824 parent companies that locate and control
the economic activities of their 15,584 affiliates in Ukraine, of which,
7,760 affiliates belong to the successive investments.
Table 7 reports a geographic coverage of our sample by 27 administra-
tive regions. Note that the majority of affiliates are controlled by domes-
tic parents (90.5%), 6.7% of total affiliates have foreign ownership and
2.8% are controlled by offshore firms1. We observe peculiar differences,
which exist between groups of affiliates. On the one hand, all offshore-
parent firms invest only once in a given region. On the other hand, the
foreign-owned parent is significantly less attracted to make successive
investments, while a high number of the first investment attracts even
bigger number of successive domestic investments.
As expected, in the whole sample the highest distribution of affil-
iates are in the capital city and its region (Kyiv with 21% of all affili-
ates in Ukraine and Kyivska, 5.1%), in regions now in coflict (Donestka
(8.7%), Crimea (4.1%), Luhanska (3.4%)), in West of Ukraine (Lvivska
(7.3%) and Khmelnytska (2.9%)) and Kharkivska (6.9%), Odeska (5.9%),
Dnipropetrovska (5.1% ) “oblasti”.
For the purpose of our research, we link activity and financial in-
formation of firms with industry-level metrics of downstreamness. We
source the data for the last directly from Antra`s and Chor (2013), accord-
ing to which the relative location of industry in production processes is
1We define an offshore firm as a firm, whose ownership belongs to the countries located
in offshore financial centers.
83
Table 7: Sample coverage: Regional distribution
Affilliates by domestic parent Affilliates by foreign parent Affilliates by offshore parent
Region in country Allaffiliates
First
investment
Second+
investments
All
affiliates
First
investment
Second+
investments
All
affiliates
First
investment
AR Crimea 625 268 357 12 9 3 9 9
Cherkaska 328 122 206 14 10 4 16 16
Chernihivska 265 95 170 10 8 2 17 17
Chernivetska 154 43 111 4 2 2 1 1
Dnipropetrovska 700 278 422 53 33 20 37 37
Donetska 1305 803 502 25 12 13 31 31
Ivano-Frankivska 238 88 150 17 9 8 13 13
Kharkivska 1022 616 406 35 20 15 12 12
Khersonska 188 74 114 8 1 7 3 3
Khmelnytska 417 222 195 18 12 6 14 14
Kirovohradska 212 82 130 5 2 3 13 13
Kyiv 2656 1553 1103 524 346 178 99 99
Kyivska 725 387 338 57 40 17 18 18
Luhanska 497 251 246 19 10 9 7 7
Lvivska 1076 536 540 43 40 3 12 12
Mykolayivska 195 96 99 10 4 6 10 10
Odeska 861 504 357 36 25 11 16 16
Poltavska 351 134 217 32 12 20 27 27
Rivnenska 231 81 150 7 7 0 8 8
Sevastopol 82 25 57 3 0 3 1 1
Sumska 234 68 166 3 1 2 16 16
Ternopilska 215 77 138 11 9 2 8 8
Vinnytska 346 131 215 12 5 7 6 6
Volynska 227 92 135 14 12 2 4 4
Zakarpatska 202 62 140 32 30 2 9 9
Zaporizka 398 172 226 9 4 5 10 10
Zhytomyrska 334 118 216 15 9 6 8 8
Total 14109 6987 7122 1041 681 360 434 434
measured as the distance from final consumers, thus, giving an orienta-
tion to technological processes over different stages of production, even-
tually leading to the production of final goods. Hence, downstreamness
metrics are normalized on a range from zero to one, where one is equal
to the full proximity to final demand and zero is the initial start of pro-
duction life-cycle.
Considering the absence of the detailed Input-Output table for Ukrai-
ne, we use the 2002 Input-Output Tables by US Census Bureau to ob-
tain average measures of the relative position of each industry in the
production processes. Moreover, we exploit the DuseTuse measure of
downnstremness metrics, which is built as the ratio of the aggregate di-
rect use of an input to the aggregate total use of that industry and Down-
Measure, which weighs for the average position of that industry in the
supply chain at which an industrial output is used. After converting the
4-digit codes of Nace Rev. 2 to 6-digit of the Naics Rev. 2007, we merge
our sample with downstreamness metrics and then, we use an average
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of parents’ and affiliates’ primary activities to obtain their positioning
along the supply chain.
Table 8 reports the ten highest and lowest values of DuseTuse and
DownMeasure. The lowest downstreamness values refer to the industries
in the mining of metal ores (iron, uranium, thorium or non-ferrous met-
als), forestry and logging, wireless telecommunications, while the high-
est values tend to be in construction, hunting and other service activities,
footwear, explosives, and mattresses manufacturing.
Table 8: Highest and lowest values of downstreamness metrics from do-
mestic sample
Nace Rev.2 Industry label DuseTuse Nace Rev.2 Industry label Down
Lowest 10 values Lowest 10 values
0710 Mining of iron ores .0084538 0210 Silviculture and other forestry activities .2176004
0220 Logging .0242411 0710 Mining of iron ores .2298953
0210 Silviculture and other forestry activities .0458819 0220 Logging .2335644
0729 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores .0834818 0240 Support services to forestry .2456087
0721 Mining of uranium and thorium ores .0834818 0729 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores .2488951
0990 Support activities for other mining and quarrying .0970084 0721 Mining of uranium and thorium ores .2488951
4312 Test drilling and boring .0970084 6010 Radio broadcasting .2491208
0240 Support services to forestry .1289696 6120 Wireless telecommunications activities .2491208
1091 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals .1385337 0161 Support activities for crop production .2576531
Highest 10 values Highest 10 values
8790 Other residential care activities 1 4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 1
8720 Residential care activities for mental retardation,mental health and substance abuse 1 4321 Electrical installation 1
8810 Social work activities without accommodationfor the elderly and disabled 1 4211 Construction of roads and motorways 1
8899 Other social work activities without accommodation n.e.c. .9996711 4322 Plumbing, heat and air conditioning installation 1
8610 Hospital activities .9988837 9603 Funeral and related activities 1
1520 Manufacture of footwear .9967057 4399 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c 1
2051 Manufacture of explosives .995551 4329 Other construction installation 1
9602 Hairdressing and other beauty treatment .9836294 4110 Development of building projects 1
9604 Physical well-being activities .9836294 4311 Demolition 1
3103 Manufacture of mattresses .9779319 0170 Hunting, trapping and related service activities 1
Table 9 reports the average downstreamness for parent and affiliates,
which we also present in groups of first and successive investments.
Thus, an average parent has a DownMeasure around 0.57 with a range
from a minimum 0.21 to a maximum of 1, what cannot make an initial
and absolute positioning on a supply chain, as it can be far from the fi-
nal consumer. In fact, DuseTuse as the unweighted downstreamness (we
take it as a reference), varies from 0.04 to 1. We argue that the key driver
for affiliates’ positioning on the supply chain is the relative positioning
of the parent and not an absolute. Looking further at affiliates divide,
we observe that for parent company it is important to have affiliates in
intermediate and final production with respect to parent specialization.
Fig. 20 shows the difference on the DownMeasure for the length of the
supply chain, which is evident with respect to distributions of DuseTuse
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Table 9: Downstreamness across firms
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Parent DuseTuse 7758 0.5918959 0.1340894 0.0458819 1DownMeasure 7773 0.572182 0.2110365 0.2176004 1
All affiliates DuseTuse 15312 0.5843613 0.1723158 0.0084538 1DownMeasure 15386 0.5730618 0.2200015 0.2176004 1
of which
First investment DuseTuse 7766 0.5869945 0.154813 0.0084538 1DownMeasure 7783 0.5841195 0.21936 0.2176004 1
Successive investments DuseTuse 7554 0.5832959 0.1853899 0.0084538 0.9996711DownMeasure 7607 0.560547 0.217194 0.2176004 1
metrics for parent/affiliate companies. It starts at the value of .2176 in
our firm-level sample. Further, parents and affiliates show a thicker right
tail in both DownMeasure and DuseTuse distributions.
Figure 20: Parents’ and affiliates’ downstreamness from sample
Moreover, in Table 10, we report the number of affiliates in Ukraine
compared to the DownMeasure with their parent. Note that the majority
of affiliates is more downstream with respect to parents (52% of total affil-
iates in Ukraine), while almost 33% of firms are more upstream and only
15% of total affiliates work within the same industry as parents. Looking
at the comparison of parents to first investment DownMeasure, we ob-
serve that the decision to establish affiliate closer to the final production
is higher by 5%. It is necessary to mention that only 8.6% of successive
investments work in the parent’s industry.
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Table 10: The number of firms by downmeasure
All Affiliates First investment Successive investments
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Parent DM = Affiliate DM 2,339 15.01 1,675 21.41 664 8.56
Parent DM > Affiliate DM 5,083 32.62 2,878 36.78 2,205 28.41
Parent DM < Affiliate DM 8,162 52.37 3,271 41.81 4,891 63.03
Total 15,584 100.00 7,824 100.00 7,760 100
We use the SankeyMATIC (2017) tools to map the distribution of af-
filiates, which includes first investment and successive investments with
respect to parents. First, we divide the DownMeasure metrics for par-
ent firms into quartiles: q1 ∈ [0, 0.413); q2 ∈ [0.413, 0.608), q3 ∈ [0.608,
0.804), q4 ∈ [0.804, 1]. Then, we use the same quartiles for the first in-
vestment and successive investments. Therefore, we group firms by the
set of ranges. We end up with 1,820 parents in the first quartile, 3,731 in
the second, 450 in the third and 1,737 in the fourth. Thus, we see that
parents firms are more midstream and downstream. Fig. 21 illustrates
the visualization of parents decisions2.
Moreover, if the 51.4% of parents firms from the first quartile estab-
lish the first investment in Ukraine more downstream, the 48.9% of the
parents from the fourth quartile will position Ukrainian subsidiary in
the more upstream industry with respect to their primary activity. Only
16.2% of parents firms from the second quartile will choose more up-
stream positioning for their Ukrainian firm and 22.4% downstream. Fi-
nally, 45.8% of parents firms from the third quartile will work in more
upstream economic activity with respect to the primary one and 14.2%
in downstream. Also, we observe that a big share of affiliates stays in the
2In the Fig. 21 first column (Fq1-Fq4) stands for the firms of the first investment, the
second column (Pq1-Pq4) for the parent companies, finally, the third column (Sq1-Sq4) for
the firms of successive investments. The numbers should be interpreted with a help of
Table D1 as following. 6,943 is a number of all affiliates that have their parent in the first
quartile (Pq1). It is important to notice that only 885 firms of first investments and 1,602
firms of successive investments are also in the first quartile. Thus, other 4,456 affiliates
are more downstream than their parent. Further numbers of parents column should be
interpreted analogously. Fq and Sq columns should be read as, for example, 1,736 firms of
first investment located in the first quartile include 885 firms with the parents of the first
quartile (Pq1), 604 of Pq2, 51 of Pq3, 196 of Pq4.
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Figure 21: Downstreamness of Firms by Quartiles (DownMeasure)
same range of parents positioning.
We expect that the location decision pattern of parents along the sup-
ply chain is similar to the first and successive investments. In addition,
the first conclusion, which we can make is the pattern of the position-
ing of firms on the supply chain in Ukraine is more downstream with
respect to our preliminary results. Moreover, the distribution of Down-
Measure metrics is already signaling the location of firms more close to
the final production. Our findings show that successive investments will
distribute as follows: 26.9% of total affiliates of successive investments
are in the more upstream range, 39.7% are relatively in the middle, and
33.4% belong to industries of more final production.
Finally, Table D2 reports the summary statistic of the measures that
we use in both parts of empirical estimation. The first part of the table
presents the parent level variables (number of affiliates in Ukraine, addi-
tionally we use dummy parents’ country of origin) and the controls for
affiliates (the time fixed effect for investment, labor productivity, capital
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intensity and size of the company). The second part of the table shows
statistics for the firm-level controls of first and successive investments
(size of the company, labor productivity, capital intensity).
4.4 Empirical analysis
The purpose of this section is to explain the position of subsidiaries of
MNEs in Ukraine along the value chain as a function of a parent’s down-
streamness. We divide our analysis into two parts, which show the cor-
relation of downstreamness between parents, first and successive invest-
ments and the direction of this correlation. We use the OLS and multi-
nomial logistic method to estimate the probability of affiliates down-
measures with respect to the parents downstreamness (DownMeasure or
DuseTuse) and their positioning on the supply chain. Also, we provide
the robustness check of our results together with introducing the “smile
curve” for Ukrainian affiliates.
4.4.1 General pattern
We start the first baseline with estimation of the following equation:
Yi(j) = β0 + β1Yj + β2Pj + β3Ai + εi(j) (4.1)
where Yi(j)c is the ith affiliate downstreamness, measured for Down-
Measure and DuseTuse (Antra`s and Chor, 2013), integrated by the jth par-
ent. Further, we define independent variables, where Yj stand for jth
parent downstreamness, Pj collects parent’s control measures for total
number of controlled affiliates and country of ownership, Ai collects af-
filiates firm-level control measures for labor productivity, capital inten-
sity, size and establishing order.
Table 11 reports results for the first baseline. We confirm our expecta-
tion that the affiliates in Ukraine will go more downstream with respect
to the parent. Moreover, our findings show that parent downstreamness
affects significantly positive the affiliate downstreamness in all specifica-
tions, as we reject the null hypothesis with 95% confidence.
89
Table 11: Baseline estimations, impact of parents on all affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Parent Downmeasure 0.260∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(27.05) (26.59) (25.49)
Parent DuseTuse 0.315∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(26.21) (26.01) (25.45)
Foreign -0.0283∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗ -0.00153 -0.00263 0.00145 0.0138∗
(-3.89) (-2.80) (-0.20) (-0.46) (0.25) (2.30)
Offshore -0.0276∗ -0.0175 0.000654 0.0129 0.0180 0.0284∗∗
(-2.11) (-1.32) (0.05) (1.26) (1.74) (2.71)
Affiliates number 0.000855 0.00213∗ 0.00155 0.00406∗∗∗ 0.00475∗∗∗ 0.00367∗∗∗
(0.87) (2.14) (1.52) (5.37) (6.18) (4.66)
Constant 0.439∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(71.04) (68.85) (54.54) (53.55) (52.85) (47.61)
Affiliates firm level controls
Establishing order YES YES YES YES YES YES
Size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 15292 15292 15198 15209 15209 15116
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In columns (1)-(3), we report that affiliates in Ukraine are relatively
close to their parents on the supply chain, as the more downstream par-
ent leads to more downstream affiliate, which is confirmed also by in-
cluding the affiliates firm-level controls. Columns (4)-(6) show the effect
of the parent DuseTuse metrics, which is even more positive and signifi-
cant. The larger number of affiliates tends to increase their downstream-
ness, although these results are statistically significant only for DuseTuse,
which suggests an increase of the contribution of goods from an industry
that parents are specialized on.
Furthermore, Table D3 reports the results of the same model 4.1, but
instead of all affiliates, the dependent variable is the first investment.
Tables D4-D5 show the results of our baseline estimation with the dif-
ference that we estimate the correlation of the downstreamness measure
of successive investments (the dependent variable) with parents or first
investments downstreamness (independent variables).
Thus, we see that results do not significantly change from the overall
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model. The results of the downstreamness measures confirm that there
is a high correlation between parents and first/successive investments.
Also, it is necessary to mention that the subsidiaries are staying prox-
imate to the parents, even when we test the dependency of successive
investments from the first investment. Moreover, these results are in line
with the findings of del Prete and Rungi (2017), who argued that parent
companies and affiliates tend to be located in proximity to supply chains.
Subsequently, we argue that such results on the proximity of parents
versus affiliates can be explained by the low integration of Ukrainian
production in GVCs. The existing barriers of the Ukrainian economy
and law regulations make a negative impact on business attractiveness
for new FDIs. Moreover, the problems with business environment tend
to the failure of integration to the worldwide production, where MNEs
play a crucial role. Moreover, the Ukrainian export-import has a very
complex, corrupted and bureaucratized system, which leads Ukraine to
be a trade outsider. Nonetheless, other factors, including trade tariffs
and restrictions, the efficiency of border management, etc., demand the
new trade agreements and policies to ensure the more deep integration
with the international supply chain. Thus, the recent agreement with EU
(DCFTA3) can improve the Ukrainian competitiveness and consequently,
will involve Ukrainian business more in the global supply chains.
Considering that Ukraine has comparative advantages in the produc-
tion of manufacturing goods, it has a high probability to become one of
the global logistics hub, which will be focused on the high technologies
and innovations. For this, the negotiations on promoting the Ukrainian
exports should be one of the priorities if the country wants to be highly
integrated into the global supply chains.
3Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) are free trade areas between EU
and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Also, it is associated with the free trade access to the
EU’s internal market in selected sectors for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. For Ukraine it
was working de-facto from 1 January 2016, officially from 1 September 2017.
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4.4.2 Robustness check
For the robustness check, we use the multinomial logit model to explain
the possible discrete choices of what happen with the direction of cor-
relation between parents and affiliates: “will subsidiaries go relatively
upstream or downstream?”. We divide affiliates into three groups by
downstreamness with respect to the parents downstreamness. For this,
we define the dummy variables for the difference between affiliates and
parents downstreamness, as follows:
D = 0, if (Ia − Ip) = 0D = 1, if (Ia − Ip) > 0
D = 2, if (Ia − Ip) < 0
(4.2)
where D is a dummy variable, Ia is an affiliates downstreamness
(DownMeasure or DuseTuse) and Ip is parent’s downstreamness. We use
D = 0 as a baseline for our estimation models, which means that the
downstreamness of affiliates and parents is the same (e.g., they special-
ized in totally the same production).
Table 12 reports the results, which correspond to the fact that invest-
ments in Ukraine will position more downstream on the supply chain.
Moreover, Tables D6-D8 show the similar results.
Note that Ukraine is a more upstream country, which is specialized in
the production of raw goods or goods that are at the beginning of the pro-
duction cycle (e.g., manufacturing in metallurgy, mining, agriculture and
chemical sectors, etc.). Besides the fact that Ukraine is already included
in GVCs with raw materials, it concentrates mostly at the low margin
level. Thus, it is necessary for the Ukrainian government to consider the
increase of integration into the global value chains with respect to the
production of the goods, which will create a high value-added. Further-
more, the absence of Ukrainian export’s promotion to foreign markets,
especially to the EU-market, has been associated with a number of barri-
ers, which are mainly related to the exporting tariffs. As a consequence,
the foreign investments in Ukraine are mostly concentrated in the ser-
vices sector (e.g., finance and retail trade) and a relatively small share be-
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longs to manufacturing (mostly concentrated in metallurgy), that gives
us an explanation for the more downstream result. It is also important to
understand that for any investor it could be more beneficial to go mid-
stream or downstream if the country is more upstream.
Table 12: All affiliates, Difference Dummy (mlogit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy>0
Parent Downmeasure -5.297∗∗∗ -5.270∗∗∗ -5.249∗∗∗
(-31.69) (-31.44) (-31.11)
Parent DuseTuse -4.043∗∗∗ -3.981∗∗∗ -3.938∗∗∗
(-16.99) (-16.68) (-16.30)
Foreign 0.224∗ 0.196 0.341∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗
(2.22) (1.91) (3.17) (4.05) (3.43) (4.83)
Offshore 0.778∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗
(4.12) (3.90) (4.08) (6.14) (5.69) (5.91)
Affiliates number 0.409∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(17.24) (16.93) (15.93) (21.43) (20.83) (19.63)
Second investment -0.297∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗ -0.250∗∗ -0.235∗∗
(-3.57) (-3.50) (-3.39) (-3.24) (-3.07) (-2.86)
Third+ investment -0.533∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.524∗∗∗ -0.578∗∗∗ -0.555∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗
(-5.42) (-5.32) (-5.28) (-6.01) (-5.76) (-5.67)
Constant 3.347∗∗∗ 3.288∗∗∗ 3.730∗∗∗ 2.711∗∗∗ 2.565∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗
(35.17) (32.45) (26.85) (19.49) (17.87) (17.76)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummy<0
Parent Downmeasure 1.274∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗
(10.52) (11.13) (11.08)
Parent DuseTuse 5.476∗∗∗ 5.566∗∗∗ 5.656∗∗∗
(23.12) (23.38) (23.46)
Foreign 0.228∗ 0.108 0.227∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.229∗ 0.263∗
(2.18) (1.02) (2.04) (3.21) (2.14) (2.36)
Offshore 0.0539 -0.0870 -0.0803 0.179 0.0370 0.00431
(0.25) (-0.40) (-0.36) (0.85) (0.17) (0.02)
Affiliates number 0.413∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(17.00) (16.12) (15.07) (18.43) (17.56) (16.89)
Second investment -0.188∗ -0.168∗ -0.166∗ -0.213∗ -0.196∗ -0.202∗
(-2.28) (-2.04) (-1.99) (-2.56) (-2.34) (-2.40)
Third+ investment -0.534∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗
(-5.35) (-4.95) (-4.94) (-5.04) (-4.65) (-4.77)
Constant -0.378∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗ -0.208 -2.893∗∗∗ -3.103∗∗∗ -3.019∗∗∗
(-4.45) (-6.60) (-1.57) (-19.44) (-20.15) (-16.34)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 15481 15481 15386 15466 15466 15371
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Moreover, in the recent years, the Ukrainian government together
with European programs started to improve the integration and increased
the cooperation in particular industrial sectors with international mar-
kets and particularly, with EU market. Thus, new agreements between
Ukraine and EU/other countries (e.g., Canada) will give more opportu-
nities to the first to be more involved in the global supply chains and to
grow the value-added. Note that the high value-added is a very impor-
tant “export guide”, on which the country should be oriented.
Another key point of the global value chains importance for Ukraine
considers the perspective for the renovation of Donbas and its structural
adaptation, especially considering that now it is involved in the armed
confrontation and in the state of deep economic recession. Then again,
the uniqueness of the specialization of this region can help to develop
the favorable conditions for the economy openness and doing business,
which will contribute to the integration into GVCs.
4.4.3 Smile curve
In this section, we stress the previous robustness check with respect to
the data on financial accounts of the firms in Ukraine. We use the method-
ology described by Rungi and del Prete (2017). It is important for us to
understand, where exactly on the supply chain the more value added is
created. For this purpose, we challenge the existence of the “smile curve”
in Ukraine. We start to estimate the equation for this test as follows:(
V alue added
Turnover
)
ij
= β0 + β1Xj + β2Zi + εij (4.3)
where the ratio of value-added on turnover value is the value-added
content of firm i active in industry j. The term Xj include alternatively
downstreamness metrics and squared terms. The term Zi collects firm-
level controls presented in Table D9. Standard errors are clustered by
4-digit industries.
Thus, after the estimation of the model, in Fig. 22 we report the
quadratic fit for firm-level value-added content along supply chains for
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Ukraine. We test the model for both downmstreamness metrics (Duse-
Tuse and Downmeasure) to provide the robust results. We observe not
typical behavior for the curve that we relate to the fact that the num-
ber of firms, which belong to the sector of services, is almost five times
more than firms of the manufacturing sector. Additionally, we report that
more capital-intensive firms correlate with a lower value-added content
in production, whereas more productive, smaller and older firms tend to
generate more value added.
Figure 22: Quadratic fit of firm-level value added content on downstream-
ness metrics
Moreover, both plots show that if the firm locates in upstream or
downstream, it will create less value-added. Such results lead to the deci-
sion of positioning the economic activity on the supply chain in the mid-
stream, which will bring comparative advantages and more value-added
to a firm in Ukraine. Hence, we confirm our results that the affiliates in
Ukraine are positioning as more downstream rather than upstream. In
case of Ukraine, when the country is more specialized in the production
of raw materials, for companies is better to choose the activities that are
more proximate to the intermediate production. Also, the participation
of Ukraine in the global value chains depends on its policy and tariff reg-
ulations. Although Ukraine has a high potential to become one of the
competitive economies in international trade, it still should approve a
number of requirements for the simplification of trade procedures and
barriers.
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4.5 Conclusions
Nowadays, the growth of the national economy is defined not only by
its GDP or exports but also with respect to the value-added and coun-
try’s position in the global value chains. For Ukraine, the positioning at
the supply chain has special importance as the deep integration into the
GVCs is highly correlated to the economic development. Such integra-
tion is possible while implementing and cooperating within the interna-
tional trade agreements. Note that Ukraine approved the WTO Trade Fa-
cilitation Agreement (TFA) in 2015. It is associated with the acceleration
of export-import activities and the significant reduction of trade costs.
Nonetheless, the implementation of TFA requires more attention and ef-
forts in Ukraine. Such low level of the TFA performance has a negative
impact not only on the trade but also it can create additional problems for
the country (non-implementation of requirements leads to the fines and
sanctions). Thus, the policies improvement with respect to the TFA can
help to expand the reach of the markets and variety of goods of interna-
tional trade. As a result, it will lead to the deepening of the integration in
the worldwide supply chain. Furthermore, the new agreements through
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in particular, Eastern Partner-
ship, will allow Ukraine to become a highly competitive country with
attractive business-climate and reliable platform for investments and in-
novations in the near future. Also, the DCFTA and its requirements will
help to overcome the non-tariff barriers and reach the European stan-
dards of production. In general, this agreement opens new possibilities
and allows to create the base for active participation in the GVCs.
Moreover, we tested the optimal organizational pattern of parents
and affiliates position along the supply chain at the firm-level. We found
that in general, affiliates in Ukraine tend to be more downnstream, which
is associated with a possible fact of the existent export barriers in the
country. Our results are robust after different specifications. Further-
more, we introduced the “smile curve”, which also confirmed our results
and first intuition.
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Appendix D
Table D1: Number of affiliates with respect to parents by quartiles of down-
stremness
Parents
quartile
Number
of first investments
by quartiles
Parents
quartile
Number
of successive investments
by quartiles
Pq1 [885] Fq1 Pq1 [1602] Sq1
Pq1 [583] Fq2 Pq1 [1843] Sq2
Pq1 [122] Fq3 Pq1 [887] Sq3
Pq1 [230] Fq4 Pq1 [791] Sq4
Pq2 [604] Fq1 Pq2 [327] Sq1
Pq2 [2289] Fq2 Pq2 [800] Sq2
Pq2 [206] Fq3 Pq2 [101] Sq3
Pq2 [632] Fq4 Pq2 [350] Sq4
Pq3 [51] Fq1 Pq3 [26] Sq1
Pq3 [155] Fq2 Pq3 [82] Sq2
Pq3 [180] Fq3 Pq3 [58] Sq3
Pq3 [64] Fq4 Pq3 [33] Sq4
Pq4 [196] Fq1 Pq4 [82] Sq1
Pq4 [563] Fq2 Pq4 [276] Sq2
Pq4 [90] Fq3 Pq4 [53] Sq3
Pq4 [888] Fq4 Pq4 [248] Sq4
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Table D2: Firm controls
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Parents
(Log of) number of affiliates 7824 0.197291 0.471913 0 8.30499
Affiliates
(Log of) labor productivity 15495 4.855193 1.458423 -3.06222 14.39832
(Log of) capital intensity 15549 4.812609 1.862413 -2.82583 15.44873
First investment
(Log of) labor productivity 7777 5.096373 1.516816 -3.062222 14.04332
(Log of) capital intensity 7804 4.821642 1.825979 -2.825833 15.44873
Successive investments
(Log of) labor productivity 7718 4.612169 1.354446 -2.975529 14.39832
(Log of) capital intensity 7745 4.803508 1.898492 -1.845827 14.18362
Table D3: Baseline estimations, impact of parents on first investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First inv
Downmeasure
First inv
Downmeasure
First inv
Downmeasure
First inv
DuseTuse
First inv
DuseTuse
First inv
DuseTuse
Parent Downmeasure 0.279∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(23.89) (23.55) (22.46)
Parent DuseTuse 0.309∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(23.62) (23.61) (22.56)
Foreign -0.0278∗∗ -0.0233∗ 0.000412 -0.00402 -0.00637 0.0143∗
(-3.13) (-2.57) (0.04) (-0.64) (-0.98) (2.15)
Offshore -0.00364 0.00262 0.0242 0.0328∗ 0.0286∗ 0.0489∗∗∗
(-0.19) (0.14) (1.25) (2.42) (2.08) (3.55)
(log) Affiliates number 0.00329 0.00452 0.00532 0.00276 0.00166 0.00168
(0.63) (0.85) (1.00) (0.74) (0.44) (0.44)
Constant 0.428∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(57.87) (53.94) (44.63) (49.86) (47.76) (46.18)
Affiliates firm level controls
Time FE for investment YES YES YES YES YES YES
Size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 7733 7733 7681 7703 7703 7651
Adj. R2 0.073 0.074 0.091 0.068 0.068 0.091
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D4: Baseline estimations, impact of parent on successive investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Parent Downmeasure 0.222∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(13.11) (12.99) (12.77)
Parent DuseTuse 0.330∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(14.00) (13.91) (13.95)
Foreign -0.0261∗ -0.0184 -0.00366 0.000565 0.00707 0.00502
(-2.05) (-1.44) (-0.28) (0.05) (0.65) (0.44)
Offshore -0.0480∗∗ -0.0358∗ -0.0242 -0.00403 0.00595 0.00230
(-2.66) (-1.97) (-1.33) (-0.26) (0.38) (0.15)
(log) Affiliates number 0.000758 0.00258∗∗ 0.00358∗∗∗ 0.00453∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗ 0.00561∗∗∗
(0.85) (2.81) (3.67) (6.45) (8.05) (7.18)
Constant 0.460∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(41.01) (41.61) (30.50) (25.96) (26.56) (21.80)
Affiliates firm level controls
Size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observation 7559 7559 7517 7506 7506 7465
Adj. R2 0.029 0.037 0.049 0.025 0.032 0.033
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table D5: Baseline estimations, impact of first on successive investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
Downmeasure
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
Affiliate
DuseTuse
FI DownMeasure 0.395∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(25.46) (25.09) (24.73)
FI DuseTuse 0.289∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(18.27) (18.37) (18.53)
SI labor productivity 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.00142
(6.85) (0.72)
SI capital intensity -0.0143∗∗∗ 0.00422∗∗
(-9.58) (3.21)
Constant 0.356∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(31.14) (31.93) (23.64) (38.45) (38.95) (26.59)
First investment firm level controls
Size YES YES YES YES YES YES
Successive investment firm level controls
Size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Observations 7568 7568 7527 7510 7510 7470
Adj. R2 0.083 0.090 0.100 0.044 0.051 0.053
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D6: Dependence of the Difference between First Affiliates and Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy>0
Parent Downmeasure -5.042∗∗∗ -5.015∗∗∗ -5.003∗∗∗
(-25.67) (-25.45) (-25.18)
Parent DuseTuse -4.427∗∗∗ -4.371∗∗∗ -4.341∗∗∗
(-15.40) (-15.17) (-14.85)
Foreign 0.269∗ 0.199 0.392∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(2.23) (1.62) (3.03) (3.69) (2.66) (4.39)
Offshore 0.591∗ 0.491 0.568∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(2.20) (1.80) (2.07) (4.01) (3.34) (3.73)
(log) Affiliates number 0.0472 0.0274 0.0162 0.141∗ 0.108 0.0866
(0.68) (0.39) (0.23) (2.07) (1.56) (1.23)
Constant 3.275∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 3.767∗∗∗ 2.983∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗ 3.534∗∗∗
(29.49) (27.10) (22.44) (17.84) (16.47) (16.59)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummy<0
Parent Downmeasure 1.351∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗
(9.35) (9.76) (10.20)
Parent DuseTuse 5.420∗∗∗ 5.466∗∗∗ 5.728∗∗∗
(19.37) (19.48) (19.98)
Foreign 0.230 0.120 0.230 0.389∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.320∗
(1.81) (0.92) (1.69) (3.09) (2.42) (2.37)
Offshore 0.326 0.178 0.161 0.246 0.135 0.0241
(1.07) (0.58) (0.52) (0.79) (0.43) (0.08)
(log) Affiliates number 0.0676 0.0403 0.00974 0.0751 0.0564 0.0333
(0.96) (0.57) (0.13) (1.05) (0.78) (0.45)
Constant -0.373∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗ -0.368∗ -2.813∗∗∗ -2.935∗∗∗ -3.200∗∗∗
(-3.74) (-5.02) (-2.30) (-16.01) (-16.18) (-14.27)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observation 7773 7773 7721 7758 7758 7706
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.118 0.124 0.109 0.111 0.119
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D7: Dependence of the Difference between Successive Affiliates and
Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy>0
FI DownMeasure 0.368 0.454∗ 0.446∗
(1.66) (2.03) (1.97)
FI DuseTuse 3.201∗∗∗ 3.264∗∗∗ 3.193∗∗∗
(10.94) (11.16) (10.84)
FI medium size 0.128 0.0583 0.0348 0.202 0.117 0.0779
(1.16) (0.52) (0.31) (1.79) (1.02) (0.67)
FI large 2.794∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 1.731∗∗∗ 1.604∗∗∗
(21.01) (19.08) (17.32) (12.19) (10.85) (10.12)
FI very large 0.751∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(5.12) (4.32) (4.12) (4.71) (3.90) (3.53)
Constant 0.530∗∗∗ 0.328∗ 1.067∗∗∗ -1.199∗∗∗ -1.405∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗
(3.38) (2.00) (4.65) (-6.34) (-7.26) (-2.98)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummy<0
FI DownMeasure -0.336 -0.221 -0.286
(-1.43) (-0.94) (-1.19)
FI DuseTuse 1.336∗∗∗ 1.404∗∗∗ 1.241∗∗∗
(4.59) (4.83) (4.23)
FI medium size 0.474∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(4.08) (3.30) (3.08) (4.64) (3.78) (3.51)
FI large 2.175∗∗∗ 1.942∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ 1.742∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗∗
(15.50) (13.27) (11.63) (10.91) (9.25) (8.69)
FI very large 0.616∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.492∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.459∗∗
(3.92) (2.77) (2.93) (3.90) (2.68) (2.77)
Constant 0.491∗∗ 0.226 1.270∗∗∗ -0.401∗ -0.633∗∗ 0.300
(2.98) (1.31) (5.27) (-2.14) (-3.28) (1.15)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 7675 7675 7633 7669 7669 7627
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.077 0.082 0.085 0.089 0.094
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D8: Dependence of the Difference between Successive Affiliates and
Parents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DownMeasure
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy
DuseTuse
Dummy>0
Parent Downmeasure -5.955∗∗∗ -5.917∗∗∗ -5.958∗∗∗
(-18.71) (-18.52) (-18.44)
Parent DuseTuse -3.265∗∗∗ -3.194∗∗∗ -3.163∗∗∗
(-7.60) (-7.38) (-7.24)
Foreign 0.159 0.155 0.211 0.306 0.285 0.328
(0.86) (0.83) (1.08) (1.72) (1.59) (1.74)
Offshore 0.894∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗ 0.879∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗
(3.34) (3.22) (3.19) (4.47) (4.26) (4.23)
(log) Affiliates number 0.403∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(17.29) (16.76) (15.36) (22.35) (21.57) (20.06)
Constant 3.249∗∗∗ 3.154∗∗∗ 3.563∗∗∗ 1.847∗∗∗ 1.682∗∗∗ 2.068∗∗∗
(17.71) (16.51) (13.81) (7.34) (6.49) (6.67)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Dummy<0
Parent Downmeasure 1.077∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗
(4.87) (5.21) (4.86)
Parent DuseTuse 5.686∗∗∗ 5.825∗∗∗ 5.804∗∗∗
(12.71) (12.88) (12.71)
Foreign 0.246 0.139 0.283 0.225 0.112 0.172
(1.35) (0.75) (1.45) (1.20) (0.59) (0.86)
Offshore -0.136 -0.282 -0.219 0.166 -0.00416 0.0491
(-0.44) (-0.91) (-0.70) (0.57) (-0.01) (0.16)
(log) Affiliates number 0.403∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(16.88) (15.64) (14.03) (18.92) (17.65) (16.28)
Constant -0.622∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗ -0.199 -3.361∗∗∗ -3.668∗∗∗ -3.182∗∗∗
(-3.82) (-5.26) (-0.80) (-11.96) (-12.66) (-9.35)
Affiliates size NO YES YES NO YES YES
Other controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 7708 7708 7665 7708 7708 7665
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.178 0.180 0.148 0.152 0.154
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D9: Description of Variables
Variable Description Source
Value added content It is the value added (Operating Revenue - material costs) over Turnover Orbis
Capital intensity It is the ratio between fixed assets over number of employees in log Orbis
Age It is the age of the firm in log Orbis
Size It is the number of employees in log Orbis
Productivity It is the value added over number of employees in log Orbis
Price-cost margin It represents the level of competition, defined as:[operating revenue - (cost of material + costs of employees )]/ operating revenue] Orbis
Foreign It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm i is a foreign owned affiliateand 0 otherwise. Orbis
Table D10: Least squares results
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Value added content OLS OLS OLS OLS
DuseTuse 0.332 -2.753
(0.345) (5.618)
DuseTuse2 -0.230 2.445
(0.265) (5.006)
Downmeasure 0.620 -1.253
(0.459) (6.950)
Downmeasure2 -0.514 1.336
(0.340) (5.336)
Capital intensity -0.0150*** -0.0159***
(0.00478) (0.00442)
Size -0.0335*** -0.0340***
(0.00425) (0.00437)
Age 0.0259** 0.0260**
(0.0119) (0.0120)
Productivity 0.0783*** 0.0761***
(0.00830) (0.00799)
Price-cost margin 0.0338 0.0339
(0.0322) (0.0322)
Foreign -0.0395*** -0.0390***
(0.0129) (0.0131)
Constant 0.374*** 0.335** 0.645 1.128
(0.132) (0.166) (2.033) (1.568)
Observations 13,033 13,099 13,678 13,608
R-squared 0.321 0.324 0.000 0.000
Errors clustered by 4-digit industry YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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